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Larson: Law’s Enterprise

LAW’S ENTERPRISE:
ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES & LEGAL ANALOGY
Brian N. Larson*

ABSTRACT
Reasoning by legal analogy has been described as mystical, reframed
by skeptics using the deductive syllogism, and called “no kind of
reasoning at all” by Judge Posner. Arguments by legal analogy happen
every day in courtrooms, law offices, and law school classrooms, and they
are the essence of what we mean when we talk of thinking like a lawyer.
But we have no productive and normative theory for creating and
evaluating them. Entries in the debate over the last twenty-five years by
Professors Sunstein, Schauer, Brewer, Weinreb, and others leave us at an
impasse: the “skeptics” are too focused on the rational force offered by
the deductive syllogism when they should attend to the kinds of arguments
that can provide premises for deduction—exactly the work that legal
analogy accomplishes. Meanwhile, the “mystics” expect us to accept
legal analogy without an account of how to discipline it. Using the
argumentation schemes and critical questions of informal logic, this
article constructs a theory grounded in philosophy, but kitted out for
action. The theory is not skeptic or mystic, but dynamic.

* J.D., Ph.D. Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. For their valuable
comments on earlier drafts of this essay and related work, I would like to thank Dr. Randy Gordon,
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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers make arguments before judges using legal analogies every
day. A lawyer claims the judge should grant his or her client’s motion
because this case is like earlier cases where courts granted the same type
of motion and unlike earlier cases where courts denied such a motion.
Law students invest considerable effort during their first year learning this
form of argument. They learn it not just in their legal theory, analysis, and
writing courses, but also in their common-law courses such as torts and
contracts, and especially in courses where professors engage in Socratic
dialogue. This kind of reasoning occurs in other fields,1 but it has a
“special prominence” in the law.2 Indeed, arguing by legal analogy may

1. Grant Lamond, Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHILOSOPHY
(Edward
N.
Zalta
ed.,
Spring
2016),
§ 1,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/legal-reas-prec/ (last visited May 19, 2018).
2. Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal
Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 925, 926 (1996).
OF
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be what we mean when we say “thinking like a lawyer.”3
We may live in law’s empire, a realm that highly values rational
consistency and logically determinate, correct answers about the law, in
which “propositions of law [are] taken to be sound or true.”4 Nevertheless,
on a day-to-day basis, the work we do consists of legal analogy and
related categories of argumentation, dialogic activities where conceptions
of soundness and truth compete—what I call “law’s enterprise.” And so,
law professors tell their students that they need to think logically, but
arguments from analogy are not logically valid; that is, they cannot
achieve the highest degree of rational force, where the truth of the
premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion.5 There is a sense in which
every law student and lawyer knows this, and the problem has not escaped
the attention of jurisprudes and other philosophers of law.6 Two stances
toward the problem purportedly predominate: on the one hand are the
skeptics (as Harvard Professor Scott Brewer calls them),7 who doubt the
rational force of legal analogy, though some of them attempt to clean it
up by converting it to a form of rule-based argumentation. They deny the
existence of legal analogy or acknowledge it and attempt to convert it to
deduction. On the other hand are the mystics (Brewer’s term again),8 who
say legal analogy is a special kind of reasoning, with its own way of
working, but they do not explain how to discipline it—how to produce
and evaluate it according to some set of normative standards. They
essentially ask us to trust them, or at least to trust legal analogy.
But trust is in short supply among lawyers, especially when evaluating
the argumentation of opposing counsel. Legal scholars, judges, and
lawyers want means for assessing, critiquing, and possibly attacking such

3. See Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Analogy, Expertise, and Experience, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 249, 261 (2017). See also Lloyd L. Weinreb, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN
LEGAL ARGUMENT ix (2d ed. 2016) (“[T]he use of analogy is at the very center of legal reasoning, so
much so that it is regarded as an identifying characteristic not only of legal reasoning itself but also of
legal education.”); Richard A. Posner, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 86–87 (1990) [hereinafter
Posner, PROBLEMS] (Legal “analogy is the principal candidate for a method that will set lawyers apart
from everyday reasoners.”).
4. Ronald Dworkin, LAW’S EMPIRE 110 (1986).
5. See infra Part I(C).
6. See infra Part I(C).
7. Brewer, supra note 2, at 953. See generally infra Part I(C). Among texts discussed there that
are at least arguably those of skeptics are Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 571 n.2
(1987) [hereinafter Schauer, Precedent]; Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3; Larry Alexander, Bad
Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57, 57 (1996); Frederick Schauer, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2009) [hereinafter Schauer, THINKING].
8. Brewer, supra note 2, at 952. Schauer and Spellman prefer the terms “celebrants,” supra note
3, at 250 and “defenders,” id. at 266. See generally infra Part I(C). Among texts discussed there that are
at least arguably those of defenders are Cass Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741
(1993) and Weinreb, supra note 3. Brewer classes himself as neither skeptic nor mystic, but I contend that
he aligns most closely with the skeptics.
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argumentation. Lawyers want these means when evaluating judges’
opinions and deciding whether to appeal. They may also want them as
tools for creating stronger arguments of their own. In short, they want a
theory of legal argument that is not skeptical or mystical but dynamic.9
This article provides a theoretical framework for legal analogy that is
both normative and productive.10 In other words, this framework equips
legal scholars, judges, and lawyers with tools to reconstruct (where
necessary) and rationally criticize the legal analogies of others. It also
provides this group with tools to construct strong arguments and
counterarguments of their own from legal analogy. It makes a case for
using dialogical argumentation schemes11 as models for constructing and
assessing legal arguments, and particularly legal analogies. Finally, it
provides a more detailed explanation of the process of identifying or
reconstructing relevant similarities and dissimilarities between cases than
is currently available in existing literature.12
Argumentation schemes do not make legal analogies deductively
valid—nothing can do that. Nevertheless, though argumentation schemes
do not deliver that level of rational force, they do provide the means to
assess legal analogies, to subject them to rational critique that can lead to
more-or-less confident assertions about their quality as legal
argumentation. And that, too, is a central part of law’s enterprise.
Part I describes the course legal scholarship regarding legal analogy
has taken so far, after clarifying what this article means by
“argument(ation)” and “legal analogy.” It then shows that logical
deduction, the gold standard for rational force and legal argumentation
and the darling of the skeptics, can do only a small part of the hard work
of the legal analyst and the proponent of legal arguments. Nevertheless,
skeptical scholars generally try to convert legal analogy into a deductive
type of argument to shore up its rational force—the strength of an
argument’s form. In so doing, however, scholars focus too closely on the
logical form of an argument and not enough on the complexity of the
premises. Part I also shows that induction, as philosophers understand the
term, has very little to do with law at all. What we are left with is noninductive analogy—an unruly type of argument—and an impasse or
aporia.
9. Dynamic,
OXFORD
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY
ONLINE
(March
2018),
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/58818, last visited May 20, 2018 (“Of or pertaining to force in action or
operation; active.”). The word comes from Greek δυναμικός meaning “powerful,” and from δύναμις
meaning “power, strength.” Id.
10. Whether this theory is empirically descriptive is a matter for future study. See infra Part III(D)
and note 256; Schauer & Spellman, supra note 3, at 268.
11. See infra Part II(B). See generally Douglas Walton, Chris Reed & Fabrizio Macagno,
ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES (2008).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 204–217.
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Part II proposes a new tack, introducing informal logic and dialogical
argumentation schemes to achieve practical rationality in naturallanguage arguments, like those we see in the law. Informal logic and
argumentation theories do not abandon deduction, but rather they
acknowledge that the premises for deductions must themselves be the
product of argumentation, and that those foundational arguments usually
are not deductive. Rather, argumentation theory calls on arguments’
proponents and opponents to be rational people arguing reasonably in “a
critical dialogue known as philosophical ‘dialectics.’”13 One way they can
do so is by employing argumentation schemes, presumptively acceptable
argument forms that can be defeated with the use of critical questions.
Part II shows how, in the law, even valid deductive argument forms are
defeasible.
Part III pursues this new course, describing and applying the legal
analogy and legal (dis)analogy argumentation schemes. This part also
extensively considers the challenge of identifying relevant similarities
and dissimilarities—a problem of great theoretical and practical concern.
Finally, this section offers an extended analysis of the briefs leading to an
opinion in a real case.
After the article provides a solid foundation for future research into
argumentation schemes generally, and legal analogy and (dis)analogy
argumentation schemes specifically, the conclusion will look to future
work to broaden and deepen these efforts. It will claim that the study of
legal argumentation and argumentation schemes should be dialogical—
just like argumentation schemes themselves. Thus, empirical work may
warrant changes to the argumentation schemes presented here; and the
principles of reasonableness and rationality undergirding argumentation
schemes may ultimately provide grounds for changes in how lawyers
argue.
I. THE OLD COURSE: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY
We expect the law to “[t]reat like cases alike.”14 This is an important
principle in American legal thinking. In theory, it supports fairness and
predictability: the law should treat similarly situated individuals the
same,15 and predictability permits those subject to the law to plan their
activities efficiently in such a way that their expectations are not

13. Harm Kloosterhuis, Analogy Argumentation in Law: A Dialectical Perspective, 8 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 173, 174 (2000).
14. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7, at 595. See Brewer, supra note 2, at 936.
15. See Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 42 (noting principles like “equal justice under law,
equal protection of the laws, equality before the law, one law for rich and poor, and so forth”).
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frustrated.16 We also expect that legal theory or jurisprudence will provide
“a body of objective norms . . . or a set of analytic methods . . . that can
be used to ensure that judicial decisions will be objective, determinate,
impersonal.”17 Consequently, the law needs a theory to account for
production and criticism of arguments by legal analogy given their
widespread use. Nevertheless, “despite its . . . special prominence in legal
reasoning . . . , it remains the least well understood and explicated form
of reasoning.”18 This article takes important steps to address this gap by
providing a theory of legal argument using argumentation schemes and
by providing an argumentation scheme specifically for legal analogy.
A. Argumentation
This article is concerned with argumentation, defined here as a series
of propositional sentences—called “premises”—arranged in a form that
supports the truth or acceptability of another propositional sentence,
called a “conclusion.”19 As used here, “argumentation” includes both the
premises and conclusion.20 Based on this definition, any written or spoken
legal analysis—whether it appears in a memorandum analyzing some
aspect of the law, a lawyer’s brief written to persuade to a court, or a
court’s opinion written to justify or explain a decision—contains
argumentation.21
This article is not particularly about legal reasoning, defined here as a
“mental activity of marshaling one’s premises, detecting logical

16. This view is not without shortcomings. Predictability may to some extent justify the use of
precedent and legal analogy, but we are still confronted with the question: “To what extent is a
decisionmaking environment willing to tolerate suboptimal results [i.e., bad precedents] in order that
people may plan their lives according to decisions previously made?” Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7,
at 597.
17. Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 7.
18. Brewer, supra note 2, at 926. Not everyone agrees that legal analogy actually exists, or if it
does, that it is good to have around. See Alexander, supra note 7, at 57.
19. Cf. Leo Groarke, Informal Logic, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, § 2
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2017), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/logic-informal/
(last visited May 21, 2018) (claiming argumentation is “an attempt to provide evidence in favour of some
point of view,” consisting of “collections of premises and conclusions.”).
20. See J. Anthony Blair, Relevance, Acceptability and Sufficiency Today, GROUNDWORK IN THE
THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION: SELECTED PAPERS OF J. ANTHONY BLAIR 87 (2012) [hereinafter Blair,
RAS Today] (An argument is “a claim and a reason or reasons that support it.”); Trudy Govier, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ARGUMENT 45 (1999) [hereinafter Govier, PHILOSOPHY] (“[A]n argument is minimally
composed of premises (one or more) and a conclusion.”); Trudy Govier, A PRACTICAL STUDY OF
ARGUMENT 1 (7th ed., 2014) [hereinafter Govier, STUDY] (same).
21. Professor Schauer might disagree, as he distinguishes the argument of lawyers from the
justification of judges, which, though they share a logical structure, he says are “separate events within a
larger rhetorical setting.” Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7, at 571 n.2. As we are interested in the
schematic, if not logical, structure of all such events, the distinction is not productive here.
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connections, and making inferences.”22 It “is a cognitive process, or
various kinds of cognitive process.”23 In other words, reasoning is what
goes on in our heads and argumentation is a presentation in words of
premises and conclusion.24 The distinction has occasionally hung up
theorists thinking about legal analogy and other problems of legal
theory.25 Looking into folks’ heads is considerably more difficult than
analyzing what they say or write in support of their conclusions. The
means to do the former are not accessible to most legal scholars and
practitioners.
Nevertheless, some entries in the literature exploring legal analogy
focus on the cognition that underlies or typifies it. For example,
Professors Schauer and Spellman discuss whether experience and
expertise in the law permit lawyers and judges to reason analogically in
the ways particularly relevant to law, but they do not explain how lawyers
and judges argue for their conclusions.26 They note that scientific research
suggests reasoners jump from particular to particular without the need for
explanatory rules.27 For them, “[w]hat makes analogical reasoning
distinctive is that although people who draw analogies see similarities that
are necessarily based on principles or theories, these principles or theories
are often so embedded in their thought processes that they are not
consciously perceived.”28 Professor Weinreb offers a full-throated
defense of analogical reasoning, principally on cognitive grounds.29
Professor Berger also explores the cognitive nature of thinking by and
about analogies, focusing on the role of intuitive (System 1) thinking with
and about them rather than reflective (System 2), or rational, thinking.30

22. Stephen F. Barker, ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 269 n.2 (6th ed. 2003) (emphasis added).
23. J. Anthony Blair, The “Logic” of Informal Logic, GROUNDWORK IN THE THEORY OF
ARGUMENTATION: SELECTED PAPERS OF J. ANTHONY BLAIR 101, 102 (2012).
24. Barker, supra note 22, at 5. This distinction in terminology might not be acceptable to all
scholars. E.g., Robert Alexy, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION 14 (Ruth Adler & Neil MacCormick
trans., 1989) (“Legal reasoning will be understood here as a linguistic activity.”). And the OED offers
“argue” as a synonym of the verb “reason.” Reason, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (March
2018), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/159070, (last visited May 21, 2018).
25. Consider Judge Posner’s critique of Professor Weinreb: “Weinreb has confused how judges
think with how they talk [or write].” Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 761,
765 (2005-2006) [hereinafter Posner, Reasoning] (reviewing Lloyd L. Weinreb, LEGAL REASON: THE
USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT (1st ed. 2005)).
26. See generally Schauer & Spellman, supra note 3.
27. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 3, at 266 (citing Adam E. Green, et al, Neural Correlates of
Creativity in Analogical Reasoning, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING, MEMORY &
COGNITION 264, 269–71 (2012); Adam E. Green, et al, Connecting Long Distance: Semantic Distance in
Analogical Reasoning Modulates Frontopolar Cortex Activity, 20 CEREBRAL CORTEX 70, 73 (2010)).
28. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 3, at 266.
29. See Weinreb, supra note 3, at 114–22.
30. See generally Linda L. Berger, Metaphor and Analogy: The Sun and Moon of Legal
Persuasion, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 147 (2013). For discussion of the System 1–System 2 distinction popularized
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Professor Brewer discusses the role of abduction in legal analogy.
Abduction is a process where a “reasoner notices some phenomenon . . .
that calls for explanation,” then “notices that the existence of some other
factor or set of factors could explain the given phenomenon,” and settles
on that explanation “as the tentatively correct explanation of the
phenomenon.”31 Thus, abduction is sometimes called “inference to the
best explanation.”32 Though it might be nothing more than an educated
guess, it is doubtless a useful way of thinking about and solving problems,
and it may be the principal way in which scientists develop hypotheses
that they then test experimentally. 33 The problem for anyone but the
reasoner, however, is that abduction calls on “creative insight” from a
person to resolve a question in a context of doubt.34 It “requires what is
inevitably an imaginative and somewhat untamed moment of rational
insight.”35
To present argumentation is to present in words the reasoning that
supports a conclusion.36 Though interesting in terms of exploring the
psychology of legal decision-making, studies like Schauer and
Spellman’s, Weinreb’s, Berger’s, and Brewer’s do not offer a means for
someone outside the head of the legal reasoner to assess the quality of the
reasoning. That is what a good theory of legal argumentation does—or at
least should do.
B. Legal Analogy
This article also discusses legal analogy—the effort of lawyers and
judges to classify or evaluate operative facts in an instant case, with
reference to cited cases, to determine whether a particular legal
consequence should apply—the effort to treat like cases alike. But what
counts as likeness is a “hard question.”37 At this point, it may be useful to
by Daniel Kahneman, see id. at 159–63. On the use of “rational” in this article, see infra notes 158 and
166–167.
31. Brewer, supra note 2, at 947–48.
32. Igor Douven, Abduction, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta
ed., Summer 2017), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/abduction/ (last visited May 21,
2018).
33. See generally id.
34. Brewer, supra note 2, at 979.
35. Id. at 1026.
36. I apply this stricture for purposes of this article. In other contexts, argumentation might be
pursued using modes other than the verbal, including the visual, symbolic, and bodily. See, e.g., Kevin
Michael DeLuca, Unruly Arguments: The Body Rhetoric of Earth First!, Act Up, and Queer Nation, 36
ARGUMENTATION & ADVOCACY 9 (1999); Assimakis Tseronis, Multimodal Argumentation: Beyond the
Verbal/Visual Divide, 220 SEMIOTICA 41 (2018).
37. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7, at 596. See also Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 42 (The
concept of treating like cases alike is “empty without specification of the criteria for ‘likeness,’ and in law
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consider a hypothetical example.
Imagine that the legislature in the state of Springer enacted Springer
Code section 15.15 in 1999: “[a]nyone who operates a vehicle in a
municipal park is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.”38 The preamble of the
act (adopted by the legislature but not included in the code compilation)
included legislative findings that numerous persons had driven their cars
and pickups onto park lawns, damaging lawns and, in one instance,
injuring a pedestrian. It cited enhancing safety and preventing damage to
public property as motivations for the act. The new statute was codified
within the chapter of Springer’s code relating to parks and recreation.
During ensuing years, there were many cases in state court against those
who drove their cars or pickups onto the park. Some defendants appealed,
but not on grounds that the charge did not involve a vehicle.
There are, however, two reported cases on the matter. In State v. Cyclist
(2006), a citizen riding a bicycle in the park “flipped the bird” at a police
officer, who promptly arrested her for operating a vehicle in the park. She
pled guilty subject to an appeal on the issue of whether her bicycle was a
vehicle within the meaning of the statute. The court of appeals reversed
the conviction, ruling that a “bicycle is not a vehicle,” emphasizing that
“a bicycle is not motorized.” In its account of the facts of the case, the
court noted that the bicyclist was wearing a neon yellow-green reflective
safety vest. A dissenting judge objected that the dictionary definition of
“vehicle” includes some things that are not motorized.39 In State v. Biker
(2008), police arrested a person sitting next to a motorcycle on the grass
of the park. The defendant claimed he had walked, not ridden, the bike to
bring it in the park. The police officer noted the lawn was heavily
damaged near the motorcycle. After a trial conviction, the defendant
appealed, arguing that the motorcycle was not a vehicle.40 The court of
appeals affirmed in a brief opinion, recounting these facts and noting only
that “a motorcycle is a vehicle of the kind the legislature sought to exclude
with the statute.”
Fast forward to 2019. Imagine a citizen riding a Boosted brand of
motorized skateboard on a sidewalk in the park collided with a pedestrian.
those criteria are political.”); Brewer, supra note 2, at 936–37 (“[T]he principle is often too vague to
resolve particular cases.”).
38. This example, among a few well known to first-year law students, is of course adapted from
H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126–27 (2d ed. 1997). Another well-known example is the ordinance
requiring dogs in the park to be leashed. Kent Greenawalt, LAW & OBJECTIVITY 42–44 (1992). So far as
I know, no one has empirically studied the propensity of legal philosophers to use regulation of public
parks as examples.
39. See
Vehicle(b),
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE
(March
2018),
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/221903 (last visited May 20, 2018) (“A means of conveyance or
transport on land, having wheels, runners, or the like; a car, cart, truck, carriage, sledge, etc.”).
40. Let us assume he did not appeal on the issue of whether he operated the motorcycle because
the jury inferred that he had ridden it under power onto the park based on other evidence presented at trial.
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The motor was engaged at the time of the collision, but several bicycles
nearby were going faster than the boarder. There was no evidence the
skateboard ever left the sidewalk, and the boarder wore a reflective safety
vest. An officer on the scene arrested her. The pedestrian did not suffer
injury and asked the officer not to arrest the boarder. A Kickstarter
website for Boosted described its board as the “[w]orld’s lightest electric
vehicle.”41
Counsel for the defendant in State v. Boostrider is likely to argue for
acquittal on grounds that the Boosted Board is not a vehicle because the
facts in Boostrider (motorized skateboard that stays on sidewalks and
goes slower than bicycles) are more like the facts in State v. Cyclist
(bicycle) than in State v. Biker (heavier motorized machine). Of course,
the prosecutor will attempt to draw the comparison rather differently. This
is the type of argument that I shall refer to as “argument from (or by) legal
analogy.”
Use of “analogy” here means that lawyers “compare whatever is at all
doubtful with something similar concerning which there is no doubt, so
as to prove the uncertain by the certain.”42 The outcome in Boostrider is
doubtful, but those in Cyclist and Biker are well documented. When
deciding whether Boostrider is more like Cyclist or Biker, the court will
consider the relevant differences and similarities among them. A court
generally may consider some differences, “such as differences in skill and
effort,” and generally may not consider others, such as “differences in
religion, race, social class, income, or relationship to the judge,”43 or the
color of the hat one of the parties wore.44
I conjecture that the most frequent use of legal analogy in legal
arguments is to resolve what Professor Neil MacCormick referred to as
“problems of classification,” where one considers whether a situation
comes within the meaning of a rule,45 or “problems of evaluation,” where
one attempts to apply a legal standard like fair use in copyright. 46 One

41. Boosted
Boards—The
World's
Lightest
Electric
Vehicle,
KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/170315130/boosted-boards-the-worlds-lightest-electric-vehicl (last
visited May 31, 2018).
42. Quintilian, ON THE TEACHING OF SPEAKING AND WRITING: TRANSLATIONS FROM BOOKS
ONE, TWO, AND TEN OF THE INSTITUTIO ORATORIA bk. 1, ch. 6, at 49 (James J. Murphy ed., 1987).
43. Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 42.
44. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 699 (1998). Of course,
in the Boostrider case, counsel might try to make something of the reflective safety vest the defendant
wore.
45. Neil MacCormick, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING 41,
141 (2005). But see Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton, Argument from Analogy in Law, the Classical
Tradition, and Recent Theories, 42 PHILOSOPHY & RHETORIC 154, 155 (Legal “analogy is used to apply
general legal rules to cases not directly falling under the classifications of the rule.”).
46. See MacCormick, supra note 45, at 41, 73–75.
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compares the instant case to cited cases47 to see whether it is appropriate
to ascribe the legal label—be it “vehicle,” “operate,” or “fair use”—to
some component of the instant case. For MacCormick, the classification
or evaluation determines whether operative facts (OF) are present, calling
for application of some normative consequence (NC).48
Lawyers and law professors often refer to this process as “analogizing”
or “disanalogizing.” Properly speaking, in cognitive science,
argumentation and rhetorical theory, case-based arguments of this kind
may be more fairly described as “argument from example” or “argument
from illustration.” Theorists in these fields consider “analogy” to apply to
a comparison that can “transfer information and procedures from one
domain to another.”49 The analogy user transfers information from one
domain, the source, to the other, the target.50 So scientists might use the
flowing of water in pipes—a source domain that the audience understands
from direct personal experience—as an analogy for the flow of
electricity—a target domain of which most have no direct personal
experience.51 But for these properly to be called “analogies,” the source
and target come from different domains—like water in pipes and
electricity in wires.52 In the Boostrider example and others discussed in
this article, the problems of classification and evaluation will not fit this
profile.53 It is worth noting here that analogy in legal reasoning has a very
47. Generally, I will use “cited case” instead of “precedent case” to refer to the source case of legal
analogies throughout this article, because I recognize that not all cases that might be used as authorities
in arguments by legal analogy have precedential value for the instant case and may therefore not be
“precedent cases” in the fullest sense.
48. MacCormick, supra note 45, at 24.
49. John H. Holland et al., A framework for induction, INDUCTION: PROCESSES OF INFERENCE,
LEARNING, AND DISCOVERY 1, 4 (1986) (emphasis added).
50. Simon Farrell & Stephan Lewandowsky, Computational Models as Aids to Better Reasoning
in Psychology, 19 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 329, 329 (2010). See also Berger, supra note
30, at 164. Alternatives to technical terms abound. For example, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca use
“phoros” (phore) for “source” and “theme” (thème) for “target.” Chaïm Perelman & Lucie OlbrechtsTyteca, TRAITE DE L’ARGUMENTATION: LA NOUVELLE RHÉTORIQUE 501 (6th ed. 2008). Govier uses
“analogue” for “source” and “primary subject” for “target.” Govier, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 20, at 139–
40; Govier, STUDY, supra note 20, at 318. In the legal literature, Schauer and Spellman use “source” and
“target.” Supra note 3, at 253-54.
51. Farrell & Lewandowsky, supra note 50, at 329.
52. See Farrell & Lewandowsky, supra note 50, at 329; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra note
50, at 502 (“[T]hème et phore doivent appartenir à des domaines différents.”). “Where the two
relationships one compares come from the same domain and can be subsumed under a common structure,
reasoning by example or illustration takes place, the [target] and the [source] providing two particular
cases of the same rule.” Id. at 502 (my translation). Berger, supra note 30, at 165, distinguishes “literal
similarity or category-like abstraction” from “analogy,” with an example of the former being “The X12
star system in the Andromeda galaxy is like our solar system” and an example of the latter being “The
hydrogen atom is like our solar system.”
53. There are analogies in the law, as, for example, when a court applies a doctrine from one part
of the law to another part of the law by analogy. See generally MacCormick, supra note 45, 205–12.
Brewer, supra note 2, at 941–94, conflates argument from analogy and argument from example. In any
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different function in statutory interpretation in continental European law,
where it is used to fill a gap or lacuna in the body of statutes.54 Logicians
also use “analogy” to refer to certain logical forms, which we will discuss
below.55 This article uses the term “legal analogy” to distinguish the sense
of the example given above and discussed below from the senses of
“analogy” that prevail in other fields.
The preceding sections make clear what this article means by
“argument by legal analogy” and why it is important. As the next section
will show, however, the leading legal theorists who have taken on the
issue tend to focus their attention on whether legal analogy can live up to
their own preferences on broader questions in legal philosophy or
jurisprudence. Though their perspectives function to refine the problem,
they fail to account for legal analogy and to provide a means for producing
and evaluating it.
C. Accounts of Legal Analogy Thus Far
Accounts of legal analogy in legal scholarship thus far have failed for
two principal reasons. First, the skeptics reject legal analogy because it
does not have the rational force of logical deduction. Skeptics either deny
legal analogy exists, converting it into a deductive form, or they doubt its
utility. Their perspective fails because deduction cannot do the work that
legal analogy must do; nevertheless, lawyers use legal analogy every day
without worrying about the absence of the deductive form. Second, the
mystics embrace legal analogy as a form of argument distinct from
deduction, but they fail to provide a framework for creating and assessing
such arguments. Their perspective leaves legal analogy dangerously
undisciplined. To make sense of these positions, it is helpful to discuss
them in the context of a refresher on logical forms.
It is commonplace in legal education and in observations about
lawyers’ performances that legal argumentation should be logical. But
that term is difficult to define. It comes from the Greek word logos, which
the Greeks used to mean a notoriously large number of things, including
“word,” “speech,” “argument,” “reason,” etc.56 For some contemporary
theorists, a logical argument is one that can be reduced to mathematical
certainty by converting it into formal, symbolic logic, or at least to a

event, the discussion below may ultimately suggest that the distinction between them is less one of kind
and more one of degree.
54. Katja Langenbucher, Argument by Analogy in European Law, 57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 481, 482–
84 (1998).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 137–154.
56. See George A. Kennedy, A NEW HISTORY OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC 11–12 (1994).
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deductive syllogism.57 Others embrace a larger ambit for “logic.” Barker,
for example, calls it the “critical study of reasoning.”58 For the moment,
we will use Barker’s definition.
We must distinguish logical “types” from logical “forms;” here,
“types” are “the broadly recognized patterns of argument that are known
under the headings ‘deduction,’ ‘induction,’ ‘abduction,’ and ‘analogy,’”
and “form” demonstrates the “relation between the truth of an argument’s
premises and the truth of its conclusion.”59 The rational force of an
argument’s form is “the degree to which the form . . . yields a reliable
judgment about the truth of its conclusion based on the assumed truth of
its premises.”60
As we will see in subsection (1), a valid deduction provides the greatest
force: if one accepts the premises as true, the argumentation form compels
the truth of the conclusion.61 The skeptics embrace the valid deduction as
the only logical form that can yield good arguments. Subsection (2)
separately considers the approach of Professor Brewer, who appears to be
a skeptic, despite denying that he is. Subsection (3) considers inductive
generalization. Valid induction provides some rational force, though less
than deduction: the truth of the premises makes the conclusion probable.
But induction (as we will define it) is of no use in the kinds of arguments
we are considering here. Subsection (4) considers arguments with the
most uncertain rational force: analogies.62 Finally, subsection (5)
recapitulates and identifies the aporia at which we find ourselves.
1. Deduction and Legal-analogy Skeptics
The most well understood form of deductive argument is the deductive
syllogism, which is well known among those in the law and looks
something like this:

57. See Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 39 n.3 (“[B]y ‘logic’ I mean deductive and
mathematical logic, not systematic thinking in general or specialized logics such as inductive logic.”).
According to Brewer, “‘logic’ was for the [Legal] Realists a (somewhat misleading) metonym for
‘deduction.’” Brewer, supra note 2, at 931.
58. Barker, supra note 22, at 1. Throughout this article, I will cite Barker’s text on logic for
propositions about logic and for discussion of logical forms. I use it principally because some of the legal
scholars taking up these issues have cited it, or earlier editions of it. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 8, at
743 n.7; Brewer, supra note 2, at 944 n.63. I make no claim that Barker’s terminology and definitions are
standard among logicians, though I have attempted to ensure his usage does not vary widely from his
peers.
59. Brewer, supra note 2, at 942.
60. Id. at 928.
61. Id. at 943.
62. This “analogy,” defined infra in text accompanying notes 137–154, has the meaning given to
it by the logicians that are sources of the discussion there.
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VALID DEDUCTIVE FORM (“MODUS PONENS”)
Major Premise:
All persons who operate a vehicle in the
municipal park are guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Minor Premise:
Mr. Biker operated a vehicle in a municipal
park.63
Conclusion:
Mr. Biker is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.64
In the syllogism, there are three propositions: the major and minor
premises and the conclusion.65 In the deductive form shown here, known
sometimes as modus ponens,66 the major premise states a general or
universal rule in the form of antecedent—“all persons who operate a
vehicle in the municipal park”—and consequent—“guilty of a gross
misdemeanor;” the minor premise presents an instance of the antecedent;
and the conclusion applies the consequence to that instance. Thus, the
syllogism can also be restated in the form of a conditional categorical rule
and its application, with the rule in our example being: “if x operates a
vehicle in the municipal park, then x is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.”
More generally, legal rules can be stated in valid deductive form:
“[w]henever OF [operative fact(s)] then NC [normative consequence].”67
In this sense, the deductive syllogism is at play in the application of

63. When calculating the rational force of this deductive form, we assume the premises are true.
There was debate in the Biker case about whether his motorcycle was a “vehicle,” and given the facts,
there might have been debate about a mixed question of law and fact: whether he “operated” it in the park.
64. Aristotle described the forms of valid deductions in the Prior Analytics, but his descriptions
there relate to categorical sentences, such as if we “let A belong to every B and B to some C” then “it is
necessary for A to belong to some C.” Aristotle, PRIOR ANALYTICS, bk. A, ch. 4, at 5 (Robin Smith tran.,
1989). The example here applies the predicate “is guilty of a gross misdemeanor” to a singular subject, a
kind of deduction in which Aristotle was less interested, because it could not yield generalizable
knowledge. Note, too, that the Prior Analytics provides Aristotle’s (and as far as we know, the world’s)
first comprehensive listing of the various valid forms that a deduction with three “terms” can take. See
Robin Smith, Appendix I to Aristotle, PRIOR ANALYTICS 229 (Robin Smith tran., 1989) (forms listed in
assertoric and modal versions). For a discussion of “categorical sentences,” see Barker, supra note 22, ch.
2. I am grateful to Professor Pannier for the observation, correct I think, that Aristotle did not identify the
example given here as one of the valid syllogistic forms because of Aristotle’s interest in universally
quantified sentences—his way to knowledge. I have nevertheless continued the common practice of
referring to this form as a “syllogism.” For discussion of categorical syllogisms of the type Aristotle
embraced, see Barker, supra note 22, at 44.
65. See Barker, supra note 22, at 44.
66. “Modus ponens” is properly a label for a move in sentential logic, rather than syllogistic logic.
See generally Barker, supra note 22, chs. 2 and 3. I adopt the practice here because it provides a convenient
and conventional label.
67. MacCormick, supra note 45, at 24. Note that I have been, and will continue to be, loose about
wording of premises, taking no pains to make consistent use of propositional, predicate, or quantified
terms. The differences, though important in formal logic, are not important here.
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(almost) any legal rule.68
In a deductive syllogism, if the premises are true, they compel the
conclusion; just as in application of a legal rule, if the rule and operative
fact are correctly and truthfully stated, they compel the conclusion. In
neither case is any further inquiry needed, and none could change the
outcome.69
It is, however, possible to make an argument of the deductive type fail
if the arguer uses an improper form. Consider this legal example:
INVALID DEDUCTIVE FORM (DENYING THE ANTECEDENT)
Major Premise:
If a witness statement is excluded under the dead
man’s statute, then it is inadmissible to prove a
claim against a decedent’s estate.
Minor Premise:
The dead man’s statute does not exclude the
statement at issue.
Conclusion:
The statement at issue is not inadmissible (i.e., it
is admissible).70
The author of this argument offers us: (A) “if antecedent, then
consequent;” (B) “not antecedent;” therefore (C) “not consequent.” The
argument holds itself out as being of a deductive type, but it has a
defective form, committing the logical fallacy of denying the
antecedent.71 The court in a case where a party made this argument
concluded there were other reasons that a statement might be excluded
and thus rejected the argument.72
Deduction is the gold standard of legal reasoning and the end-point that
proponents of legal arguments wish to reach in them.73 However, the
reason one cannot rely too heavily on deduction in actual legal
arguments—the reason deduction is insufficient for legal argument—is
premises: Aristotle recognized the syllogism only operates on its
68. See Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 42 (“[M]ost legal questions are resolved
syllogistically. A legal rule has the form of the major premise of a syllogism.”).
69. See id. at 38.
70. This example is drawn from Kevin W. Saunders, Informal Fallacies in Legal Argumentation,
44 S.C.L. REV. 343, 379 (1993) (citing Harry Levitch Jewelers, Inc. v. Jackson, 573 S.W.2d 746 (Tenn.
1978)).
71. See id. at 379. “[D]enying the antecedent involves a misunderstanding of the nature of a
conditional. The conditional ‘if p, then q’ asserts that when p (the antecedent) is true, q (the consequent)
is also true;” but “[t]he conditional allows no inference about the truth of q when p is false.” Id. Saunders
notes that the Levitch court referred to this (technically incorrectly) as a “non sequitur.”
72. See Saunders, supra note 70, at 379.
73. See MacCormick, supra note 45, at 32; Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 39 (“So
compelling and familiar is syllogistic reasoning that lawyers and judges, ever desirous of making their
activity seem as objective as possible, try hard to make legal reasoning seem as syllogistic as possible.”)

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

15

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 2

678

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

premises; it cannot provide them.74 In law, this challenge takes (at least)
two forms: (1) the difficulty of asserting that the major premise is really
true as stated, that is, that it correctly states the legal rule, and (2) the
difficulty of applying legal-categorical labels to actual instances.
Consider both in the context of the Boostrider case.75
The statute definitively states the major premise or rule in Boostrider:
“anyone who operates a vehicle in the municipal park is guilty of a gross
misdemeanor.” However, in a court subject to the Cyclist and Biker cases,
counsel for the defendant might argue that the rule now contains an
exception: “anyone who operates a vehicle, except a bicycle or smaller
vehicle, in the municipal park is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.” Counsel
for the state might similarly argue that that the rule is now “anyone who
operates a vehicle, except a non-motorized vehicle, in the municipal park
is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.” Either of these formulations is
plausible, given the precedents, but clearly counsel on each side would
formulate the exception in such a way as to support their claim.
As for assignment of legal categories, in Boostrider we have a statute
that uses a word to refer to a category of things we do not want in the
park; let us call it “VEHICLEstatute,”76 but the statute itself cannot tell us what
the contents of VEHICLEstatute are. Admittedly, there are hints in the statute,
particularly the preamble the legislature adopted, which specifically
identifies cars and pickups, and might be interpreted to have an
application limited to things that could endanger public safety or damage
public property. We can read a dictionary to see the defined meaning and
examples. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “vehicle” as a “means
of conveyance or transport on land, having wheels, runners, or the like; a
car, cart, truck, carriage, sledge, etc.”77 Assuming we could see the
category of things as reasonably definite, we might call it “VEHICLEdict.”
Another approach is to ask what use people commonly make of the word.
For example, we could collect a great body or corpus of language used on
74. Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 54 notes: “Logic, like mathematics, explores relations
between ideas rather than correspondence to facts. The legal system cannot be indifferent to issues of
empirical truth.” Aristotle acknowledged this difficulty regarding universal major premises of the form
“All A are B,” in the Posterior Analytics, when he asserted that “[i]t is impossible to perceive what is
universal and holds in every case.” Aristotle, supra note 64, bk. A, ch. 31, at 43. He admits that we can
“grasp the universal from seeing,” id., but this is, of course, a form of induction. Nevertheless, one
syllogism can provide as its conclusion a premise to be used in another syllogism.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 38–49.
76. Here, I use small-caps to indicate that “VEHICLEstatute” refers to a word’s meaning or a category
of things to which it refers (the distinction is important philosophically, but not for our purposes here).
When I refer to the word/label “vehicle,” I use quotation marks, and when I refer to an actual thing, like
my own car, I do not set the word off with any marks. So, if I say I call my vehicle a “vehicle”—intending
to mean that is a VEHICLEstatute, I am applying a label to a thing to assert that is an instance of the category
defined in the statute.
77. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 39.
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websites, like the iWeb corpus.78 We could then systematically examine
in which contexts “vehicle” appears. If it appears most commonly with
automobiles and similar large, heavy machines, but rarely with bicycles
or skateboards, we might conclude that uses outside the large-heavymachine context should not be part of the meaning of “vehicle”—that is,
should not be part of VEHICLEcorpus.79
Deduction cannot tell us whether VEHICLEstatute should overlap
completely, or at least more nearly completely, with VEHICLEdict or
VEHICLEcorpus. But lawyers must argue and the court must explain whether
a Boosted Board falls into that category to apply the deductive rule. 80 As
Judge Posner notes: “[l]egal rules frequently treat as referential words
(like ‘day’ and ‘night’) that do not have a definite referent,” as there is no
definite boundary between day and night.81
Deduction is not sufficient—but neither is it necessary to resolve
questions of these kinds. Consider the court’s decision in State v. Biker,
where it did not articulate a deductive rule that it derived from the statute,
or from the statute in conjunction with State v. Cyclist. It simply
concluded after describing the facts of the case that they fell within the
statute. This is not an uncommon argumentative move for a court to
make.82 In fact, on the traditional theory of the common law, if a court
announces a covering rule that covers more ground than required to
resolve the case against it, that rule is dictum.83 That silence regarding a
78. BYU CORPORA: BILLIONS OF WORDS OF DATA: FREE ONLINE ACCESS, corpus.byu.edu (last
visited May 23, 2018).
79. Some jurists and scholars believe corpus-linguistic methods like this to be useful for
establishing the meaning of statutory text, especially older texts. See generally, Thomas R. Lee & Stephen
C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L. J. 788 (2018). See id. at 836–43 (addressing
specifically whether a bicycle is a “vehicle” within the meaning of a hypothetical statute that was the
model for this article’s hypothetical Springer Statute § 15.15). Others are not so convinced. See generally,
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1503 (focusing on
criminal statutes); Ethan J. Herenstein, The Faulty Frequency Hypothesis: Difficulties in Operationalizing
Ordinary Meaning Through Corpus Linguistics, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 112 (2017) (criticizing more
broadly the “frequency hypothesis” upon which the author claims Lee and Mouritsen’s arguments
depend).
80. Of course, this is the task of classification, the narrower use of legal analogy that is the focus
of this article. See supra text accompanying notes 42–55.
81. Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 46. See also Weinreb, supra note 3, at 58 (“[A]lthough
the words that we use to describe our experience are cast as discrete categories, the actual phenomena are
mostly continuous.”).
82. See, e.g., Adams v. N.J. Steamboat Co., 45 N.E. 369 (N.Y. 1896), discussed at length in
Brewer, supra note 2, at 1003–06, and in Weinreb, supra note 3, at 16–19, 79–81. Weinreb asserts
vigorously that such a rule is “not normally to be found.” Id. at 79.
83. See Edward H. Levi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (2013) (“Where case law is
considered . . . [the judge] is not bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the prior judge even
in the controlling case. The statement is mere dictum.”); Weinreb, supra note 3, at 61 n.31 (noting that
stating a “covering rule” in a case “would have been dictum, because it was not necessary to the
decision”); Schauer, THINKING, supra note 7, at 56 (“Because a reason is necessarily broader than the
outcome that it is a reason for, giving a reason is saying something broader then [sic] necessary to decide
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covering rule in State v. Biker need not prevent the lawyers in State v.
Boostrider from arguing that there is such a rule as suggested above.84
Nevertheless, when discussing legal analogy, some scholars—
Brewer’s skeptics—are prepared to accept it only if it is recast in valid
deductive form, where either a covering rule or general principle is the
major premise. In the Boostrider case, this effort might take this form:
VALID DEDUCTIVE FORM: VEHICLE IN BOOSTRIDER
Rule/principle:
Every machine in or on which a person can ride
that has a motor is a “vehicle.”
Minor Premise:
Ms. Boostrider operated a machine with a motor.
Conclusion:
Ms. Boostrider operated a vehicle.
Once this determination is made, it is a trivial matter to apply the
statutory rule deductively and convict Ms. Boostrider. But how does one
identify the rule or principle?
In his discussion of the application of legal analogy—in arguing from
precedent—Professor Schauer asserts there is a process first of
identifying relevant similarities between a cited case and an instant case,
then assigning “categories of assimilation”85 that make the cited case
serve as a guide in the instant case.86 We identify the relevant similarities,
making “this determination from some other organizing standard
specifying which similarities are important and which we can safely
ignore.”87
Schauer offers an example to help define what he means by categories
of assimilation. He asks us to “[i]magine a faculty meeting considering a
request from a student for an excused absence from an examination in
order to attend the funeral of his sister.”88 Assuming the faculty grants the
request without comment, for what is it a precedent? Can students expect
to be excused “to attend the funerals of grandparents, aunts, uncles,
cousins, nieces, nephews, close friends, and pets”?89 The answer, he tells
us, depends on how broadly the category of assimilation is drawn. The
decedent in the first case could be characterized as “a sibling, a relative,
the particular case. And that seems to be dicta.”); Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7, at 580 (noting that
the rule of the case is considered dictum, though even dictum from a precedent places an argumentative
burden on a present-day arguer).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 75 and 76.
85. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7, at 582.
86. See id. at 586 (discussing use of categories of assimilation in Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l
League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922)).
87. Id. at 577.
88. Id. at 578.
89. Id. at 578.
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a blood relative, and one with whom the student has a ‘meaningful
relationship.’”90 The breadth of the category chosen will bring the new
case into it or not. Thus “we must consider the way in which the size of
the categories of assimilation might largely determine the strength of
precedent.”91
But is there a rule or principle of categorization? On the one hand, the
earlier court or faculty may not have specified the category into which it
assimilated the cited case. It may just have granted or denied the request.
The next student to come before the faculty can argue for any of the
candidate categories mentioned in the previous paragraph. On the other
hand, it may have adopted a rule of the case—“canonical language” with
an “articulated characterization.”92 For example, perhaps the faculty
adopted a resolution to excuse the student from examinations to attend the
funeral, reciting the fact that the student has a “bona fide relationship” or
“close familial relationship” with the decedent.93
In any event, Schauer appears to believe that a category of assimilation
must be drawn to join the cited case to the instant case or to distinguish
the two. This then permits a quasi-deductive application as in the example
VALID DEDUCTIVE FORM: VEHICLE IN BOOSTRIDER above.
In Professor Sunstein’s view, the legal arguer must use some low-level
principle (but not a general legal rule) to bring the precedent and instant
case into alignment. So, in an extended example drawn on R.A.V. v. City
of Saint Paul,94 a case addressing a local ordinance that prohibited crossburning, Sunstein purports to use analogical reasoning to develop and test
possible theoretical statements at this low level of abstraction, such as
“[a]cts that qualify as speech can be regulated if they produce anger or
resentment”95 and “[u]nprotected acts of expression may not be regulated
on the basis of viewpoint.”96 The result of this process is some quasideductive form applying a principle or rule that underlies the analogy for
it to work.
Judge Posner appears to share Schauer’s view that a rule must be
adopted to make the move from precedent to instant case, and that it

90. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7, at 579.
91. Id. at 591.
92. Id. at 579.
93. The Ninth Circuit dealt with such an issue when it decided that a grandparent had a “bona fide
relationship” with a visa-seeker for purposes of President Trump’s ban against travel from certain
countries; concluding that a grandparent belonged in those categories at least as much as a mother-in-law,
which the Supreme Court had previously ruled was close enough. State v. Trump, 871 F. 3d 646, 651,
659 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087–88 (2017)).
94. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
95. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 760.
96. Id. at 762.
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“presupposes some, and possibly extensive categorization.”97 He offers
this example:
The property lawyer who says that oil and gas are analogous to
rabbits, deer, and other wild animals is really proposing that the rule
governing property rights in such animals—the “rule of capture”—
is an instance of a more general rule that subsumes oil and gas: the
rule that there are no nonpossessory rights in fugitive resources.98
Posner acknowledges that “[t]he problem then is to justify the general
rule, which cannot be done either syllogistically or analogically.”99
Posner appears less concerned with identifying the categories of
assimilation from previous cases along the lines of Schauer. Though he
acknowledges that to “see one problem as being like another that has
already been solved is indeed to place the new problem on the road to
solution,”100 what matters for him from the precedents are the “values,
considerations, policies, and ethical insights found in” them.101
Professor Alexander claims that “analogical reasoning in law,” or
“ARIL,” as he calls it, does not exist, that it is a fantasy; and that if it did
exist, it would be “deformed.”102 He argues that if a court’s decision is
justified, it must be by one of three means: “showing it is morally
justified,” “showing that it follows deductively from an authoritative rule
that governs the case,” or “discernment [and presumably application] of
principles immanent in cited cases.103 Alexander concludes that the first
two forms of justification cannot provide an account of legal analogy, but
he believes the third can provide “the best account that can be given to
ARIL.” For him, the immanent principles need to be applied deductively
to have rational force.
Alexander doubts even this account of legal analogy is worth pursuing,
though, because he notes that those who wrote the cited cases may have
made mistakes—these are the “bad beginnings” to which his title refers.
The deductive form may be valid, but the premises might prove to be

97. Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 90.
98. Id. supra note 3, at 89.
99. Id. at 89. See also id. at 91 (“A set of cases can compose a pattern. But when lawyers or judges
differ on what pattern it composes, their disagreement cannot be resolved . . . by the methods of scientific
induction.”).
100. Id. at 91.
101. Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 93.
102. Alexander, supra note 7, at 57.
103. Id. at 70–72. Note that Alexander contends that the first two “two types of justification exhaust
the field for law,” id. at 70, despite then acknowledging that “both of these methodologies have room for
analogical reasoning of the type Brewer endorses,” id. at 72. For details on Brewer’s approach, see infra
text accompanying notes 107–130.
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incorrect. As for the case-to-case reasoning identified above and in some
other models of legal analogy, Alexander argues that because “the
relevance of . . . similarities and dissimilarities remains unjustified, . . .
this version of ARIL lacks any rational force.”104
According to Professor Brewer “the rule of law ideal norms of clarity,
notice, and accountability presuppose that legal commands . . . are
deductively applicable, and that vague norms—of the sort with which one
is left if legal commands are not deductively applicable—are inconsistent
with those basic values.”105 First, it is fair to acknowledge the Brewer was
writing about legal norms rather than legal arguments. Nevertheless, the
principal evidence we have about the content and application of legal
norms in practical contexts is what appears in the arguments of lawyers
and judges. Consequently, if Brewer’s assertion is true of legal norms, it
should also be true of legal argument. A dedication to deduction in legal
argument is in some sense, however, trivial: a valid deductive form has
the highest degree of rational force precisely because it is difficult to
imagine anyone arguing with the form of a valid deduction. The
conclusion really does not tell us anything that we did not know after
reading the premises.106
Given that deduction cannot do all the work of legal argument and is
not needed for some of it, we must consider other candidates. Before we
do, however, we will consider Professor Brewer’s account; though he
says it is not skeptical, it appears still to lean too heavily on deduction.
2. Abduction and Brewer’s Account
Professor Brewer is the first of these scholars to propose a method for
producing arguments by legal analogy. His goal is ultimately to “construct
and rely on a type of deductively applicable rule,” 107 what he calls an
“Analogy Warranting Rule.”108 In brief, the process involves the
proponent of the argument using “abduction” to find a candidate analogywarranting rule; the testing and justification of the candidate rule using
what he calls an “Analogy Warranting Rationale;” and then applying the
rule to the instant case.109 The analogy-warranting rule should be a
“relatively precise norm . . . so as to provide guidance in relevantly similar

104. Id. at 86-87 n.96.
105. Brewer, supra note 2, at 992–93.
106. As a result, the syllogism is either empty of value or is a form of question begging or petitio
principii. See Barker, supra note 22, at 244.
107. Brewer, supra note 2, at 927.
108. Id. at 962. The choice of “analogy warranting rule” as the name is peculiar because, as we shall
see, the rule Brewer offers does not warrant the analogy but is the result of it.
109. Id. at 962–63.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 2

684

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

cases.”110
Brewer makes the case for needing a rule. He claims that no precedent
or example “can serve as an example without a rule to specify what about
it is exemplary.”111 In a sense, this is a form of question begging. It is also
apparently not true in practice. If we consider a precedent, an example of
where the plaintiff won in a products liability dispute, one need not have
any more “rule” than that for it to be an example.112 Whether it is a useful
example for legal analogy of course depends on characteristics it shares
with a case at bar: whether they are subject to the same jurisdiction’s laws;
whether the plaintiff’s claim arises from the same (or similar) substantive
law; and whether the facts of the cases are similar. Once we have
answered these and perhaps other non-rule questions, we may argue that
the case at bar should (or should not) come out for plaintiff. Brewer could
argue that the principle that allows the identification of these particular
similarities is a rule, but that reduces all identification of similarities to
the application of rules, only because the need to do so is assumed.
Brewer provides the following schema for his approach:
Where x, y, z are individuals and F, G, H, are predicates of
individuals:
Step 1: z has characteristics F, G, . . . .
Step 2: x, y, . . . have characteristics F, G, . . . .
Step 3: x, y, . . . also have characteristic H.
Step 4: The presence in an individual of characteristics F,
G, . . . provides sufficient warrant for inferring that H
is also present in that individual.
Step 5: Therefore, there is sufficient warrant to conclude that
H is present in z.113
This schema works a little differently than the deductive argument forms
described above. This is in part because there are two arguments here.
The first argument derives the analogy-warranting rule shown in step 4;
the second applies that rule to z.
On Brewer’s model, the abduction to the rule in step 4 happens as a
result of the argument’s proponent “sifting through examples . . . that
seem instructively similar to his own case”—here the examples in x, y,

110. Id. at 981.
111. Id. at 974.
112. Indeed, Professor Weinreb argues the presence of an explicit rule in the cited case is not
dispositive: “The rule is a generalized statement of the decision, not the predicate on which the decision
rests.” Weinreb, supra note 3, at 85.
113. Brewer, supra note 2, at 966 (notes omitted).
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etc.—and then constructing a rule that explains the similarities.114 The
abduction itself is as Brewer says “an imaginative and somewhat untamed
moment of rational insight,” though he argues that the rest of the process
constrains it.115 In short, the analogy-warranting rationale must explain
and justify the rule, and if no such rationale can be found, the rule must
be changed or discarded.
As we are interested in argumentation, abduction is not helpful for our
model. The imaginative leap of the abducer—a “creative insight” or
“flash of insight”116—might be difficult to describe, and even if it is
described, it will seem irrelevant in the presence of the analogywarranting rule and its rationale, which do not become more acceptable
in virtue of the abduction being described.
Missing from Brewer’s schema is the step of creating the analogywarranting rationale. This is especially important given Brewer’s reliance
on the rationale to tame any rule arising from the untamed insight of the
abduction. His article also devotes comparatively little space to the
topic.117 Nevertheless, he asserts an important role for these rationales:
namely the establishment of the justification or “acceptability” of the
analogy-warranting rule.118
Brewer offers mostly clues about what the rationale should look like.
First, he considers whether the analogy-warranting rule is consistent with
other legal rationales, whether it “cohere[s] sufficiently with explanatory
and justificatory rationales that the reasoner is unwilling to amend.”119
Second, he considers whether it “effects an acceptable sorting” of the
precedents and the instant case.120 As for consistency with other legal
rationales or values, Brewer identifies some specific lines of argument:
an “inherent fairness” value and the value of stare decisis,121 and the “rule
of law value” which “requires laws to be consistent.”122
Brewer does not explain how or why it is that the extended analogywarranting rationale does not appear in most legal arguments, or why its
absence does not tend to draw critiques from the opponents of those
arguments.123 He gives an example of only one instance where a court
appears thoroughly to provide the rationale, and even that one he

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 979.
Id. at 1026.
Id. at 979.
Fewer than 10 of more than 100 pages in the article.
Brewer, supra note 2, at 1022.
Id. at 1022-23.
Id. at 1022–23.
Id. at 1025.
Id. at 1025–26.
See Weinreb, supra note 3, at 10.
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concludes was wrongly decided.124 It may well be, however, that he sees
legal analogies as “structurally enthymematic exemplary arguments”125
and concludes that the rationale is an omitted premise.
As the term “enthymeme” will come up again, it is worth explaining
now: an enthymeme is a common technique in argumentation, in which
the argument’s proponent suppresses one or more propositions where the
context can supply them.126 Interpreting and critiquing such an argument
requires reconstruction of the suppressed proposition(s). For example, a
conservative political candidate might say: “my opponent will attempt to
curtail gun rights because she is a Democrat.” The argument represents a
valid deduction with a suppressed major premise: “all Democrats attempt
to curtail gun rights.”127 Speakers use enthymemes for at least two
reasons: first, speakers avoid accountability for uttering the suppressed
proposition(s); they can honestly say, “I never said that!” and disagree
with a critic’s reconstruction of the argument. Second, speakers
encourage the audience to supply the suppressed proposition(s), which
may enhance the audience’s adherence to the proposition(s).128

124. See Brewer, supra note 2, at 1024–26 (discussing E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v.
Claiborne-Reno Co., 64 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1933)).
125. Id. at 987.
126. Id. at 984, describes them as “any argument—valid or invalid, deductive or nondeductive—
the logical form of which is not perspicuous from its original manner of presentation.” According to
Barker, “[a]n argument is called an enthymeme if at least one of its premises is unstated,” Barker, supra
note 22, at 221, but the term can also be “extended to arguments whose conclusions have been left
unstated,” id. at 222.
127. It is possible that even two propositions might be suppressed. For example, if a reporter asks
a conservative political candidate, “Do you think your opponent would attempt to curtail gun rights?” the
candidate might respond simply, “She’s a Democrat.” Here, the major premise and conclusion are
suppressed.
128. According to contemporary researchers in organizational communication:
Through enthymemes, the [rhetor] persuades the audience by drawing on its cultural
beliefs and attitudes. It invites the audience to complete the argument based on
identification with the rhetor’s background . . . . Enthymemes are a powerful tool of
persuasion because they allow audience members to draw on their preexisting
beliefs—those that are integral to the institutional order.
E. Johanna Hartelius & Larry D. Browning, The Application of Rhetorical Theory in Managerial
Research, 22 MGMT. COMM. Q. 13, 24 (2008). George Kennedy characterized Aristotle’s view:
The real determinant of an enthymeme in contrast to a syllogism is what a popular
audience will understand without tiresome pedantry. Aristotle regards . . . the
enthymeme[] as addressed to an audience that cannot be assumed to follow intricate
logical argument or will be impatient with premises that seem obvious.
ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 42 n.55 (George A. Kennedy tran., 2d ed.
2007).
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Arguments, even in law, are commonly enthymematic.129
Brewer’s schema for legal analogy obscures the work of the analogy,
and his description of the analogy-warranting rationale is too rudimentary
to provide clear guidelines. Consequently, it seems unlikely that Brewer’s
model “provides clear criteria that lawyers, judges, students, and scholars
can use critically to assess any given argument by analogy.” 130
3. Induction: Not Helpful for Legal Argument
I will follow Barker in describing inductive arguments as “arguments
whose conclusions do not strictly follow from the premises and are not
claimed to do so, but whose conclusions can in principle be tested by
further [empirical] observations.”131 So “if the premises of an inductive
argument are true and the reasoning is good, then it is reasonable to
believe the conclusion; the conclusion is probably true.”132 An inductive
argument, even if valid when made, is by definition defeasible. In other
words, even if all the premises are true, further observations of particulars
in the world could yield evidence that defeats the conclusion.
There are two brands of induction: inductive generalization, also called
“enumerative induction,”133 and inductive analogy, which is a special case
of hypothesis evaluation.134 Each of these types of argument is important
in managing day-to-day human affairs but has limited utility in legal
argument.
Lawyers may refer to “induction” when talking about legal arguments,
but neither of these argumentation forms will sort out the problems in
State v. Boostrider because “induction,” at least by Barker’s definition,
requires circumstances where the truth of the conclusion in the argument
can be tested by further observation.135 Legal argumentation is normative
and productive, in that if a court adopts a conclusion, it becomes the law.
But it is not defeasible in the same way as an inductive argument; more
observations about the world cannot defeat the conclusion of a legal

129. Brewer, supra note 2, at 984.
130. Id. at 925.
131. Barker, supra note 22, at 13. See also Brewer, supra note 2, at 945 (“In inductive argument,
the truth of the premises never guarantees the truth of the conclusion.”).
132. Barker, supra note 22, at 181.
133. James Hawthorne, Inductive Logic § 1, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2018), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/logic-inductive/
(last visited May 23, 2018).
134. Id.
135. See supra text accompanying note 131. See also Weinreb, supra note 3, at 2 (distinguishing
legal reasoning from inductive reasoning; “The reasoning of a doctor or an engineer is readily and in the
normal course put to the test. The patient’s health improves, or it does not; the bridge stands, or it falls.”);
id. at 5 (An inductive argument is not formally bound in the same way [as deductive], but the conclusion
can be tested experimentally, and, again, either it is verified or it is not.”).
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argument. If the court in Boostrider concludes the Boosted Board is a
vehicle, no later-discovered instance of a court saying a Boosted Board is
not a vehicle will change the outcome in Boostrider. There is no way to
observe empirically whether the conclusion is correct.136 What lawyers
need is what Barker calls “non-inductive analogy.”
4. Analogy and the Mystics
The non-inductive analogy is a way to reason about normative
outcomes from past events. This is the form that Sunstein identifies with
legal analogy. Barker asks us to imagine that a university honor code
prohibits “lying” and “cheating” and that the honor council must then
determine whether a student who has written a bad check137 has violated
the honor code.138
Lying and cheating are indisputably offenses against the honor code.
Now, writing a bad check is like falsely stating that you have money
in the bank. Also, writing a bad check is very like cheating, for you
persuade the merchant to accept the check in exchange for
merchandise by deceptively suggesting that the check is good. Since
writing a bad check is so like lying and cheating in these respects, it
therefore resembles them also in being a violation of the honor
code.139
We might formalize the lying side of this argument in this way:
NON-INDUCTIVE ANALOGY: HONOR CODE
Major premise:
Lying is an honor code violation in virtue of the
fact that the liar makes a false statement.
Minor premise:
Writing what one knows to be a bad check
involves making a false statement about funds
available in one’s bank account.140
Conclusion:
Writing what one knows to be a bad check should
be classified as a violation of the honor code.
136. Though, of course, there can be further arguments about whether the argument supporting the
conclusion was a good one. See also Sunstein, supra note 8, at 745 n.18.
137. Some readers may never have handled a checkbook, though they are still quite common, I
believe. A check is a “draft . . . signed by the drawer, payable on demand, drawn on a bank, and
unconditionally negotiable.” Check, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A bad check is one “that
is not honored because the account either contains insufficient funds or does not exist.” Id.
138. See Barker, supra note 22, at 225.
139. Barker, supra note 22, at 226–27.
140. I am grateful to Dr. Randy Gordon for pointing out on an earlier draft that this minor premise
did not include the drafter’s knowledge; without the check writers’ knowledge that the account would be
overdrawn, this minor premise would probably be false.
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Barker notes that this is not a deductive argument, something that is
perhaps self-evident from its lack of deductive form.141 It “differs from
induction—the conclusion being argued for does not embody predictive
conjectures going beyond what the premises say.” 142 This is like a legal
analogy, in that further observation cannot test the honor council’s
decision. The conclusion of the council will prove its own truth.
Weinreb makes a defense of non-inductive analogy and legal analogy
as a reliable type of reasoning that is distinct from deduction and
induction. He pushes back against the thinking of Brewer and others who
appear to accept legal analogy, despite that fact it is “logically flawed,”
as part of a “hierarchy of rules” deductively applied; Posner, who appears
to view it as existing but of little or no value; and Alexander, who claims
it does not exist in law.143
Weinreb’s central defense of legal analogy is that analogical reasoning
works in many human contexts perfectly well without the need for formal
deductive or inductive machinery.144 He also notes that it is acceptable to
lawyers and judges: though analogies are at “the center of contention
between lawyers on opposite sides and between majority and dissenting
judges, there is scarcely a trace of criticism of analogical argument
generally. On the contrary, the importance that is usually attached to the
choice of analogy suggests quite the opposite.”145 “The persistent effort
of legal scholars to downgrade analogical reasoning, if not, indeed, to
dismiss it altogether, is simply ignored by the lawyers and judges who
regularly employ it.”146 Thus, “[i]f the normative force of law depends on
its commitment to reason, a place has to be found for analogical
arguments on their own terms.”147
This is fine as far as it goes, but while Weinreb critiques the approach
proposed by Brewer in some detail,148 he does not offer his own model
for constructing or evaluating arguments. Instead, he grounds his support
for legal analogy sans deductive covering rules in the practical wisdom
of attorneys practicing it. He writes, for example, that a legal reasoner

141. Id. at 227. Given the brief discussion of the enthymeme above, see supra text accompanying
notes 126–128, it might be tempting to reconstruct this in a deductive argument form. What is missing is
perhaps a major premise along the lines of “Whatever is like lying and cheating ought to count as an honor
offense.” Id. at 282 n.46. The problem, as Barker notes, is that such a premise may not be both “known to
us and sufficient to render the argument deductively valid.” Id. Worse, it may simply function as question
begging or petitio principii, that is, the premise assumes the conclusion. Id.
142. Id. at 227.
143. Weinreb, supra note 3, at 8–9.
144. Id. 114–22.
145. Id. at 10.
146. Id. at 134.
147. Id. at 113.
148. Weinreb, supra note 3, at 107–13.
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“will quickly dismiss most of the concrete details of the situation before
him . . . as irrelevant to [a party’s] liability, not because he knows and can
recite a multitude of rules so providing but because his accumulated
experience in the law tells him that those facts are not likely to count.”149
This continues the cognitivist approach discussed above, which argues for
the reasonableness of reasoning by legal analogy but does not provide a
structure for constructing and assessing arguments by legal analogy.150
The problem is that arguments by analogy are hard to discipline. Even
when used by logicians, analogies can be unruly. Consider two examples
from Barker:
Suppose the postman once met a boxer dog and found that it had a
bad temper and tendency to bite. If he now meets another boxer dog,
he may reason by analogy that this dog also is likely to have a bad
temper and a tendency to bite. Here his reasoning rests upon
analogy.151
Barker does not criticize this conclusion, implying that it is reasonable.
And he offers another example:
[S]uppose there has been a thunderstorm every afternoon at five
o’clock for the past week, and I infer that there will rather likely be
one tomorrow too. Here my data are true and my reasoning may well
be perfectly logical, and yet is possible that my conclusion is false;
perhaps no storm occurs on the morrow. Here it was reasonable for
me to make this inference, even though the conclusion turned out
not to be true.152
Here, Barker overtly calls this reasoning reasonable. But given the
premises in these arguments are true, does the form of either make a
reasonable argument? My neighbor Rosie is a rescue boxer with a sweet
temperament. Would the postman’s argument be equally strong if he
concluded, after encountering Rosie, that the next boxer he meets will
also be sweet tempered? And why is it reasonable to conclude tomorrow’s
weather will be like today’s, or last week’s? Is it not just as reasonable to
conclude that tomorrow’s weather is due for a change? In each of these
cases, either a small number of instances or a failure to theorize the
149. Id. at 123. He does offer some observations that may be helpful for addressing those questions,
which I will take up below. See infra text accompanying notes 204–217.
150. See supra notes 26–36 and accompanying text.
151. Barker, supra note 22, at 191–92. On Barker’s account, this in an inductive analogy, because
it could be confirmed by further empirical observations.
152. Id. at 183 (emphasis added). Again, this is inductive analogy on Barker’s account.
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relevance of each instance could weakly support a conclusion.
Barker proposes that an opponent can attack an analogy by saying it is
not a good comparison (that is, by pointing out differences) or by
employing a second analogy that is no less reasonable but reaches a
different conclusion.153 The former advice may not be particularly
helpful, in that one can always find differences and similarities between
any two instances or cases.154 The question is which differences are
relevant and how many are needed to warrant a different conclusion. The
latter advice helps little more, given that the opponent offers another
argument, which must itself be subjected to criticism.
Despite Barker’s claim that “some analogies really are better than
others,”155 neither his model nor Weinreb’s provides the means of
constructing or evaluating them. Given that a deductive argument form
could not operate in our legal context without assistance, and induction is
inapplicable to decisions of this kind, we must explore possible
frameworks for non-inductive and legal analogies.
D. The Aporia: Why We Still Need Answers
So far, Part I has shown that deduction can do only a tiny part of the
work of legal argument. At the moment just before the proponent of a
legal argument applies a universal rule deductively to the facts of her case,
she has already done all the heavy lifting—ascertaining the legal rule
(major premise) and classifying operative facts and assigning legal
categories to the instant facts (minor premises). Induction cannot help.
And we have a sense that analogy, at least as described here, is
insufficiently disciplined to permit reliable argument construction and
critique.
Legal scholars who have previously approached legal analogy have
taken three tacks: some believe that a deductive rule lies behind every
apparent use of legal analogy. Weinreb does not believe this but leaves
largely unexplained how legal analogy works in its absence. Schauer
embraces quasi-deductive application of assimilating categories. But
Alexander and Brewer, and probably Posner, support the claim that a
deduction must lie beneath the conclusion of any rational legal argument.
Alexander and Brewer ground that position on the rational force of
deduction. But of course, that is question begging: rational force is a
measure of the confidence we can have in the conclusion if the premises
are true; it ignores the truth of the premises. The law, however, is very
153. Id. at 227.
154. See Brewer, supra note 2, at 932 (“[E]verything is similar to everything else in an infinite
number of ways, and everything is also dissimilar to everything else in an infinite number of ways.”).
155. Barker, supra note 22, at 227, quoted in Brewer, supra note 2, at 952.
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concerned with whether the premises are true.156 Deduction cannot
deliver the premises, and applying deduction to premises that are not
derived deductively can deliver conclusions that are only as sound as the
weakest argument in the chain. From a practical-theoretical standpoint,
we need to strengthen that link.
The solution I propose is to increase our confidence in arguments by
legal analogy by providing a formal model for creating and criticizing
them. Part II begins by introducing a different standard for creating and
assessing legal arguments, drawn from the field of informal logic, and it
explains the general formal model of the argumentation scheme. Part III
then presents the argumentation scheme(s) for legal (dis)analogy,
including a means for assessing relevant (dis)similarity. That section
concludes with some examples from real legal arguments.
II. A NEW TACK: INFORMAL LOGIC AND ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES
This section proposes a pivot from deductive logic to standards that are
still rational and, though not formally valid, reasonable given the
circumstances in which we use them. I contend here that by “reasonable”
arguments we always mean to imply “dialogical” arguments. That is, any
standard of reasonableness for legal arguments must anticipate that all
legal arguments withstand critical scrutiny: every argument has a
proponent and an opponent.157 Even when lawyers predict the outcome of
legal disputes for clients, they are anticipating the counter-arguments that
other parties will make. Subsection A introduces informal logic and its
conception of arguments that proponents assert are rational and
reasonable but which are defeasible—subject to the critical questions of
their opponents. Subsection B explains how argumentation schemes
formalize such dialogic arguments.
A. A Standard for Good Legal Arguments
How should we make or assess a good legal argument? Deduction
plays some role, of course, in application of every general or universal
rule, but the previous section showed that it is not sufficient or even
necessary to resolve the questions of classification and evaluation that are
at the root of many sticky legal problems. This section argues that the law
should employ argumentation that meets standards of rationality and
156. See supra note 74.
157. See Weinreb, supra note 3, at 46–47 (“A judicial decision of any significance is carefully
considered and is not likely to be reached until the issue has been debated and alternative outcomes
forcefully defended. Once rendered, it is subject to review and reconsideration by other judges as well as
by lawyers and legal scholars.”).
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reasonableness that are acceptable in the community of law practitioners.
The next section introduces argumentation schemes.
First, “[t]he normative order constituted by the legal system, informed
by ‘rule of law’ principles as well as by many others, aspires to be rational
in significant ways.”158 According to Professor Brewer:
The criteria that comprise the ideal of the rule of law forge links
between the correct interpretation of legal texts and two of the basic
requirements of that ideal, predictability and notice, on the one hand,
and governmental accountability (restraint on arbitrary
governmental power, including judicial power), on the other.159
So, “in offering [an] argument, the speaker aspires to satisfy the
aforementioned rule of law ideals.”160
Professor Weinreb, meanwhile, notes that “law provides an
overarching structure within which most human affairs are conducted,
and it reaches down to the smallest details. If its demands are not to be
felt as arbitrary and oppressive, they must be, and must be perceived to
be, reasonable.”161 We can paraphrase Judge Posner to say that legal
argumentation is “practical argumentation”—“the methods by which
people who are not credulous form beliefs about matters that cannot be
verified by logic or exact observation.”162 Posner claims that judges
reason using many tools:
It is a grab bag that includes anecdote, introspection, imagination,
common sense, empathy, imputation of motives, speaker’s
authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom, memory,
“experience,” intuition, and induction (the expectation of
regularities, a disposition related both to intuition and to analogy). 163
These—along with whatever the judge had for breakfast—may in fact

158. Brewer, supra note 2, at 929. I take Brewer to mean rational in the sense that Govier means
it. Compare Govier, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 20, at 45–46 (“Rational persuasion is persuasion by
considerations that affect the assent of another person by supplying evidence or grounds that make a claim
seem more believable because of a cogent connection between that claim and the claims cited as its
support.”) with Chaim Perelman, The Rational and the Reasonable, 10 PHILOSOPHIC EXCH. 29, 29 (“The
rational corresponds to mathematical reason, . . . which grasps necessary relations, which knows a priori
certain self-evident and immutable truths, which is at the same time individual and universal.”).
159. Brewer, supra note 2, at 991–92 (internal citations omitted).
160. Id. at 992.
161. Weinreb, supra note 3, at 3 (emphasis added).
162. Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 71-72.
163. Id. at 73.
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influence
judges’
decision-making.164
Consequently,
Posner
distinguishes judges’ methods for making such decisions from their
methods for justifying those decisions in writing—their reasoning from
their argumentation.165 But our system requires that (many) judges justify
their decisions in writing according to standards the legal community
accepts, and the considerations Posner lists are not all equally acceptable
under those standards. Legal argument does not value intuition,
imagination, and speaker’s authority, for example, as much as imputation
of motives, precedent, custom, and induction. When lawyers write
persuasive briefs, they are attempting not just to persuade judges, they are
demonstrating that arguments—acceptable in the context of the legal
community—exist for the judges to grant their requests.
Philosophers of informal logic and argumentation theorists call on
arguments to “involve[] an appeal to the addressee as a rational judge
who judges reasonably,”166 where we use the terms “‘rationally’ in the
sense of using one’s faculty of reason and . . . ‘reasonably’ in the sense of
utilizing one’s faculty of reason in an appropriate way” based on
“appropriateness standards prevailing in the exchange concerned.”167 In
short, we must move from concern with the rational force of abstract
argumentation forms to the cogency of an actual argument: a cogent
argument has “premises which are acceptable to the audience to whom it
is addressed, relevant to its conclusion, and sufficient to warrant belief in
its conclusion.”168
As long ago as Aristotle, thinkers acknowledged the distinction
between the kinds of arguments that work in one situation and those that
work in another. Aristotle, for example, believed that science/knowledge
(epistêmê) was possible only regarding universal truths that could be
demonstrated with deductive reasoning.169 Unfortunately, the deductive
“validity of an argument does not guarantee the truth of its conclusion.
Logic cannot itself establish or guarantee the truth of the premisses.”170
Pure deduction and demonstration, then, is available only in fields like
164. Though not actually studying what judges had for breakfast, Danziger and colleagues showed
that “extraneous variables” influenced judges’ decision-making. Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora
Avnaim-Pessoa, Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI.
(PNAS) 6889, 6892 (2011). They examined a large number of decisions in a class of very similar cases,
noting differences between those that had happened just before a meal break and those happening just
after. Id. at 6889–90.
165. See Posner, Reasoning, supra note 25, at 91.
166. van Eemeren et al., HANDBOOK OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY 5 (2014).
167. Id. at 6 n.13.
168. Govier, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 20, at 119.
169. See Robin Smith, Notes to Aristotle, PRIOR ANALYTICS 105, 127 (Robin Smith tran., 1989).
See also Aristotle, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 13 (Jonathan Barnes tran., 2d ed. 1993).
170. Neil MacCormick, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW 25 (2005). Common usage among some
European theorists is to use “premiss” for “premise.”
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geometry, where the premises are postulated.171 In his treatises about
reasoning and argumentation on matters of public affairs, including
legislation and judicial tribunals, Aristotle acknowledged that the
premises of arguments, whether deductive or no, in those contexts had to
be drawn from less certain sources, including the views of “most people,
or the wise . . . . and such opinions as are derived from any established
arts.”172
Contemporary philosopher Stephen Toulmin concluded that the
standard of reasonableness depends on the field in which an argument
appears, and reasonable arguments may have characteristics that are both
field-invariant and field-dependent.173 Arguments “belong to the same
field when the data and conclusions in each of the two arguments are . . .
of the same logical type.”174 So, for example, arguments about geometry
proofs, legal status, biological categorization, etc.—all different fields—
might all be subject to deduction, which is field-invariant. But arguments
about legal status might properly include evidence from witness
testimony, where arguments about geometry will permit premises only
from the stock of postulates and theorems already proved; these are fielddependent constraints. The concept of “field” can be read hierarchically.
For example, Toulmin notes: “[t]he sorts of evidence relevant in [legal]
cases of different kinds will naturally be very variable. To establish
negligence in a civil case, willful intent in a case of murder, the
presumption of legitimate birth: each of these will require appeal to
evidence of different kinds.”175 Whether a legal argument is reasonable is
thus a field-dependent question, with different fields within the law
potentially having different standards. At the same time, we can expect
some standards of rationality to be field-invariant in the sense that they
apply throughout all fields of law. I contend we should expect such
standards for arguments by legal analogy.
J. Anthony Blair, Ralph H. Johnson, and Trudy Govier are
philosophers credited with foundational work in the field of informal

171. See J. Anthony Blair, Informal Logic and Logic, GROUNDWORK IN THE THEORY OF
ARGUMENTATION: SELECTED PAPERS OF J. ANTHONY BLAIR 120–21 (2012) [hereinafter Blair, Informal].
172. Aristotle, TOPICS: BOOKS I AND VIII 9 (Robin Smith tran., 1997). The subject of Aristotle’s
Topics is “dialectic problems,” id. at 10, each of which is “a question which is both important for some
purpose and the subject of significant disagreement,” Robin Smith, Commentary to id. 41, 56. Aristotle
incorporates dialectic into his theory of rhetoric, calling rhetoric an “offshoot” of dialectic and “partly”
dialectic. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC supra note 128, at 39. For Aristotle, rhetoric is the art focused on
deliberative, judicial, and other civic assemblies in Athens. Id. at 47–48.
173. Stephen E. Toulmin, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 14–15 (updated ed. 2003).
174. Id. at 14.
175. Id. at 16.
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logic.176 The work of Blair, Johnson, and Govier—and their progeny—
have been widely taken up and discussed.177
Blair and the founders of informal logic sought to replace “the thendominant (in analytic philosophy circles) logico-epistemological criterion
of ‘soundness’” under which “a ‘good’ argument is a ‘sound’ argument,
that is, one with true premises and a (deductively) valid inference from
the premises to the conclusion.”178 They recognized that human beings
make many good decisions based arguments that are not deductions or
inductive generalizations.
They proposed three criteria for a good argument: relevance,179
acceptability, and sufficiency. So in their view, “an argument is a good
one if its grounds or premises are . . . relevant as support for the claim in
question, individually acceptable, and together . . . sufficient to support
the claim on behalf of which they were offered.” 180 What counts as
sufficient, acceptable, and relevant in a given context depends on the
circumstances of that context.181 So “[s]pecial fields such as the various
sciences or professions will have standards peculiar to them for arguments
about their subject matters.”182 “For example, if the conclusion is
‘meteorological conditions are excellent,’ and the premise is,
‘Meteorologists say so,’ we scrutinize the authority much more carefully
if our purpose in knowing the conclusion is to launch a satellite rocket
than if it is to proceed with an informal family picnic.”183
Informal logic is about defeasible arguments, those whose “premises
supply good reasons for accepting their conclusions” but where
“challenges from critics or simply the discovery of additional information

176. See van Eemeren, supra note 166, at 373. Informal logic arose in philosophy classrooms in the
1960s and 1970s, in response to a sense among philosophy professors and students that courses in formal
logic did not allow students “to understand and criticize the public policy arguments of the day,
particularly those published in the media.” Blair, Informal, supra note 171, at 120–21.
177. See generally van Eemeren, supra note 166, at 381-87, 390–94, and works cited there. See also
Blair, Informal, supra note 171, at 119 (noting use of argumentation schemes in artificial intelligence).
178. Blair, RAS Today, supra note 20, at 88. See also Govier, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 20, at 6
(“[T]he [deductive] paradigm is questionable at best. It implies a uniformly negative verdict on the
soundness of all inductive arguments. Furthermore, it is untrue to the world of partial certainties in which
human beings function.”).
179. This is the relevance of premises to the conclusion they purport to support, not of analogical
(dis)similarities between cases.
180. Blair, RAS Today, supra note 20, at 87. See also Govier, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 20, at 6
(“[R]eal arguments are based on premises deemed rationally acceptable by arguers and put forward as
rationally acceptable to the particular audience to whom their argument is addressed and as providing
reasons sufficient in some context for accepting that conclusion, or at least taking it seriously.”).
181. Blair, RAS Today, supra note 20, at 90, 95, 97. Blair acknowledges that “[a]ttempts have been
made to characterize relevance and sufficiency . . . but no results have found widespread endorsement.”
Blair, Informal, supra note 171, at 126.
182. Blair, RAS Today, supra note 20, at 100.
183. Id. at 95.
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can ‘defeat’” them—can “reduce or remove the force of any justification
that the original premises supplied for their conclusions.” 184 It is in this
sense a brand of what Judge Posner calls “practical reason.”185
Many of the scholars whose work was discussed in Part I might be
uncomfortable with this conception of “logic.” But the non-deductive
components of legal argument are where the heavy lifting is, despite being
the logically weaker links in the argument chain. We need to strengthen
them to the extent we can. One way to do so is through argumentation
schemes.
B. Argumentation Schemes and Critical Questions
Argumentation schemes are formal abstractions of types of argument
that are commonly used in natural-language discourse, like legal
arguments. In the conception used here, each argumentation scheme
consists of a set of premises and the conclusion they support, much like
the valid deductive form above. Schemes, most often identified with the
work of philosopher Douglas Walton,186 provide a formal structure to
construct and evaluate natural-language arguments from the perspective
of informal logic.
“These schemes rely on the presumption that reasoning from the kinds
of grounds and via the kinds of inferences that are identified by such a
scheme is justified. They presume that such inferences are warranted.”187
Consequently, once an argument’s proponent constructs it according to a
valid argumentation scheme, its conclusion is presumptively acceptable,
and the burden shifts to the argument’s opponent to defeat or weaken it.188
Thus associated with each argumentation scheme is a set of critical
questions, the answers to which may defeat the argument or diminish its
acceptability. Argumentation schemes rely for their rational force on the
fact that they are routinely exhibited in contexts where their forms go
largely unchallenged, even if the critical questions throw particular
arguments into doubt.
The sort of inquiry suggested by the argumentation scheme, and
particularly the critical questions, is necessary and sufficient to determine
in a given context whether to accept a legal argument in that context.
Argumentation schemes are a necessary adjunct to deductive argument
forms in that deduction alone cannot deliver an acceptable legal argument.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Blair, Informal, supra note 171, at 123.
See supra note 162.
See supra note 11.
Blair, Informal, supra note 171, at 119.
See Blair, RAS Today, supra note 20, at 90.
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Consider the challenges with applying a deduction discussed above.189 In
fact, we can frame the legal deductive syllogism as a defeasible
argumentation scheme, showing that the argumentation scheme
influences the seemingly simple application of deduction in actual legal
argumentation.

ARGUMENTATION SCHEME: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL DEDUCTION190
Major Premise:
According to legal authority J, in every instance
with features f1 . . . fn, legal category A applies.
Minor Premise:
The instant case has features f1 . . . fn.
Conclusion:
Legal category A applies in the instant case.

We can instantiate this scheme using State v. Boostrider from above:191
ARGUMENT BY LEGAL DEDUCTION: STATE V. BOOSTRIDER
Major Premise:
According to Springer statutes section 15.15, any
person who operates a vehicle in the municipal
park is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Minor Premise:
Ms. Boostrider operated a vehicle in a municipal
park.
Conclusion:
Ms. Boostrider is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

In an appropriate context of informal logic, this argument is
presumptively valid. Indeed, these allegations (perhaps with some more
detail) are probably sufficient to sustain a prosecutor’s indictment of Ms.
Boostrider. But every lawyer knows that Ms. Boostrider’s attorney will
explore, and the prosecutor had better be ready to respond to, at least the
following critical questions.

189. See supra text accompanying notes 73–81.
190. See the comment below about the preliminary nature of this argumentation scheme. I do not
intend it to be complete; there may indeed be other critical questions applicable to it. A more through
discussion of the scheme will have to wait until another time.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 38–41.
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CRITICAL QUESTIONS: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL DEDUCTION
CQ1 Acceptable Scheme Question: Does legal authority J actually say
that legal category A applies in every instance with features f1 . . .
fn? That is, is the legal rule advanced a deductive one?
CQ2 Jurisdiction Question: Does legal authority J have authority over
the persons or things in the instant case?
CQ3 Authority Question: Does legal authority J govern the law
applicable in the instant case?
CQ4 Exception Precedent Question: Has any legal authority identified
an exception to the rule or is there any previous similar case where
the rule was not applied?
CQ5 Exception Policy Question: Does the policy underlying the rule
suggest there should be any exceptions?
CQ6 Instant Features Question: Does instant case have features f1 . . .
fn?
CQ7 Feature Question: With regard to each feature f1 . . . fn, has any
legal authority defined it or narrowed or expanded its definition?
Each of the critical questions can spawn an argument of its own
regarding its outcome, the result of which may be to weaken or defeat the
presumptive argument. Each question addresses one or more of the factors
for assessing arguments, whether the premises and argument form are
relevant, acceptable, and sufficient to support the conclusion. So, for
example, with regard to CQ1, what counts as an acceptable
argumentation scheme is context dependent. For example, if section 15.15
had been a factor test or other kind of legal standard,192 the deductive
argumentation scheme would be inappropriate here. This question tests
whether the argument’s proponent has misstated the major premise/rule.
The rest of the critical questions test the truth of the premises, CQ2–
CQ5 testing the major premise and CQ6 and CQ7 testing the minor
premise. CQ2 and CQ3 address the applicability of the legal authority to
the current case. In our example, perhaps the alleged offense took place
in one jurisdiction but J is the law in a different jurisdiction. Or perhaps J
is a statute that by its own terms governs only the use of motor vehicles
subject to registration with the state, but the instant case involves a
motorized skateboard. CQ4 and CQ5 consider whether there is or should
192. For Weinreb, rules “provide a determinate response to specific facts” and standards “call for
consideration of all the circumstances,” though he notes that it is debated whether the difference is
meaningful. Weinreb, supra note 3, at 6 n.3.
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be any exception to this rule. In our example under CQ4, perhaps a court
concluded that a person who drives onto parkland by necessity is excused.
The second prong of this question identifies where there might be an
implied exception based on a previous case where the rule was not
applied. As for CQ5, perhaps a legislative pronouncement identifies a
policy, and giving the rule too great or too small a scope would frustrate
that policy or interfere with other policy objectives of equal
importance.193
CQ6 asks only whether the proponent of the argument has actually
asserted that all of features f1 . . . fn are present. CQ7 does the more
complicated work of exploring the features to see if they are properly
applied here. For example, State v. Cyclist appears to have narrowed the
definition of “vehicle” in Springer statutes section 15.15. Perhaps
“vehicle” is defined somewhere else in Springer’s statutes that by its own
terms applies to section 15.15 or that may be applied by analogy. 194
I contend that when an argumentation scheme is properly
characterized, the list of critical questions it provides is exclusive; that is,
any challenge to an argument made in the form required by the
argumentation scheme will come in the form of one or more of the critical
questions identified.195
While this article is about the argumentation scheme for legal analogy,
not legal deduction, this example appears here to demonstrate how readily
critical questions complicate deductive argument forms in the law, and
how argument-schematic thinking is a necessary adjunct to legal
argument. The instance where a legal deduction can take place without
consideration of critical questions is rare, and once the questions are
settled, the deduction itself is trivial (and really, not that informative).
Argumentation schemes are a sufficient adjunct to deductive argument
forms according to two perspectives. First, inasmuch as it is the best we
can hope to do, it has to be sufficient. The two types of argument—
deduction and induction—that might have a claim to greater rational force
are simply not up to the task.
Second, in contexts subject to human judgment about normative
matters, argumentation schemes represent good arguments. Lawyers, who
are motivated to find flaws in their opponents’ arguments, do not attack
193. See generally Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), in which the Supreme
Court read the word “reasonable” into the Sherman Act.
194. In the Boostrider case, the analyst must of course also consider the same question with regard
to whether the defendant operated and whether the event happened in a municipal park.
195. This is both an empirical and normative issue, however. Normatively, we must ask whether a
certain critical question should be permitted to defeat the argumentation scheme; in other words, is it
rational to pose the critical question? Empirically, we must ask whether a certain critical question is
permitted; in other words, do practitioners in the field object to its use? The latter question is the focus of
the empirical work described infra note 256.
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the form of their opponents’ arguments when their opponents use the
techniques described here. A lawyer who has offered a presumptive legal
deduction does not react with outrage when her opponent attacks it with
the critical questions noted above.196 In short, argumentation schemes
present evidence that the arguer is using one’s faculty of reason in an
appropriate way based on appropriateness standards prevailing in the
exchange concerned.197
Of course, it is possible that two such arguments can be constructed
regarding a given legal question that point to contradictory conclusions;
they should nevertheless have sharpened the issues to give the decisionmaker the best chance of making (and justifying) a good choice.
As we saw in Part I, analogy is too undisciplined to satisfy our
expectations about rationality in the law. Part II has shown that
argumentation schemes discipline legal argument by establishing
burdens—the premises the proponent must assert for the argument to be
presumptively acceptable—and critical questions—the acceptable
avenues upon which an opponent may attack or undermine the argument.
Part III proposes, discusses, and applies the legal analogy and legal
(dis)analogy argumentation schemes in legal argument.
III. THE LEGAL (DIS)ANALOGY ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES
Part II demonstrated that legal arguments (even the apparently air-tight
deduction) can be recast schematically using argumentation schemes and
that this approach to legal argumentation is rational and reasonable. This
part delivers on the promise of this article to provide a formal description
of legal analogy as an argumentation scheme. It also describes the legal
(dis)analogy argumentation scheme and explores the question of relevant
similarity more deeply. It concludes with an analysis of some actual
lawyers’ arguments.
A. Legal Analogy Argumentation Scheme
Here is the argumentation scheme for legal analogy with a cited case,
and a case at bar, the instant case.198

196. See Weinreb, supra note 3, at 10.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 166 and 167.
198. This argumentation scheme is adapted from Walton et al., supra note 11, at 55–66.
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ARGUMENTATION SCHEME: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY
Major Premise:
Cited case and instant case are relevantly similar
in that both have features f1 . . . fn, and features
f1 . . . fn are relevant to legal category A.
Minor Premise:
Legal category A applies to cited case.
Conclusion:
Legal category A applies to instant case.
Notice that the major premise in this scheme is really a relevant
similarity premise and actually contains three assertions for each feature
f1 . . . fn: that instant case has the feature, that cited case also has the
feature, and that the feature is relevant to legal category A.
If we are considering the case State v. Biker (cited case) while
analyzing State v. Boostrider (instant case),199 we might construct this
simplified argument.
ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY: BIKER & BOOSTRIDER
Major Premise:
Biker and Boostrider are relevantly similar in that
both interpreted Springer statute section 15.15,
and in both, the machine had a motor and the
machine had wheels; and the presence of a motor
and wheels is relevant to whether the machine is
a vehicle.
Minor Premise:
The machine in Biker was a vehicle.
Conclusion:
The machine in Boostrider is a vehicle.
But further inquiry might defeat this argument. Like most
argumentation schemes, the argument from legal analogy has its critical
questions:

199. See supra text accompanying notes 38–41.
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CRITICAL QUESTIONS: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY
CQ1 Acceptable Scheme Question: Do the circumstances of this
argument permit application of legal analogy from a cited case?
CQ2 Similarity Question: With regard to each feature f1 . . . fn, is the
feature present both in the cited case and the instant case?
CQ3 Relevance Question: On what basis are features f1 . . . fn, relevant
to legal category A?
CQ4 Precedent Outcome Question: Did cited case really assign legal
category A?
CQ5 Relevant Dissimilarity Question: Are there dissimilarities g1 . . .
gn between the cited case and instant case that are relevant to legal
category A? (These may be differences in facts or in the law that
was applied.)
CQ6 Inconsistent Precedent Question: Is there some other case that is
also similar to instant case in that both have features f1 . . . fn,
except that legal category A is not applied in that case?
CQ7 Binding Precedent Question: To what extent is the cited case
binding on the court in the instant case?
CQ8 Precedent Quality Question: Was the cited case wrongly decided?
Here as in the legal deduction scheme, CQ1 asks the threshold question
for every argumentation scheme: Is it appropriate here? In theory, there
may be some circumstances where appeal to a cited case is not tolerated,
but it is difficult to identify common examples, even when one is
attempting to interpret statutory language according to its plain
meaning.200 Also as usual, CQ2–CQ4 test the accuracy of the premises.
CQ2’s reference to similarities between the cases refers both to factual
similarities (like whether the machine had a motor) and similarities in
terms of the body of law that each was applying. CQ3 considers whether
the similar features between the cases are relevant to the present body of
law. This question, taken up in more detail below, is important whenever
200. Note, however, that at least in European civil law, the use of analogy is prohibited in certain
contexts. Harm Kloosterhuis, Analogy Argumentation in Law: A Dialectical Perspective, 8 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 173, 182 (2000) (“Legal theory, as a rule, claims that the area of law to which the
legal standard belongs, determines the possibilities of using that standard analogically . . . . The most
telling example of this rule is the ban on analogy in criminal law: ‘stretching penalization’ on the basis of
analogy argumentation is contrary to the very nature of criminal law. Tax law is yet another area of law
that limits the possibilities to apply legal rules analogically [where it is] admissible only if advantageous
to the taxpayer . . . . [C]ivil law too limits the possibilities of applying analogy argumentation to legal
rules.”).
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a case-to-case comparison is made. Generally, the arguer should be able
to articulate the policy considerations that make the features relevant.
CQ4 merely tests whether the proponent of the argument has correctly
stated the outcome of the cited case.
CQ5 and CQ6 invite new information that might undermine or defeat
the argument. CQ5 looks at dissimilarities between the cited case and
instant case. These may be factual: for example, the machine in Biker was
much heavier than the machine in Boostrider, and the weight of the
machine is probably relevant to its ability to injure people and damage
property. The differences may also relate to the body of law: it is possible,
in our example, the argument’s proponent might want to use the meaning
a court gave to “vehicle” under a statute different than Springer statutes
section 15.15, perhaps the motor-vehicle registration statute. The
opponent might argue that the purposes of a vehicle registration statute—
to collect revenue to fund road construction and maintenance—and of
section 15.15—to prevent harm to persons and park property—make it
appropriate to use different definitions of “vehicle.” CQ6 is related to
CQ3 because if the answer to this question is “yes,” it casts the relevance
of features f1 . . . fn into doubt; if they can be present both when legal
category A is assigned and when it is not, it is not clear that they are
relevant to assigning the category.
Finally, CQ7 and CQ8 situate the cited case and its value within the
legal system. If the answer to CQ7 is that the cited case is binding
precedent, that is, the cited case comes from a higher court in the same
court hierarchy and constrains the action of the court in the instant case,
then the answer to CQ8 may be irrelevant.201 If the answer to CQ7 is “no,”
then an opponent of the argument has the option to try to dispose of the
analogy by challenging the quality of the decision in the cited case.
As noted above, it is most productive to see the argumentation scheme
as a presumptively acceptable argument, unless it is challenged with the
critical questions. The proponent should assert, or at least imply
(remember the discussion of the enthymeme above),202 each of the
premises in the form before the burden shifts to the opponent. Once she
has done so, however, the critical questions provide an exhaustive list of
avenues for attacking the argument.
Of course, paired with the argumentation scheme for legal analogy
should be one for legal (dis)analogy.

201. Of course, it may still be relevant to a party who plans to seek appellate review in hopes of
overturning or distinguishing the precedent. Everything is arguable in the law, and arguing that a binding
precedent reached an incorrect decision is something that both lawyers and judges do, whether or not they
choose to follow or distinguish the precedent.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 126–129.
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B. Legal D (dis)analogy Argumentation Scheme
Here is the argumentation scheme for legal (dis)analogy:
ARGUMENTATION SCHEME: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL (DIS)ANALOGY
Major Premise:
Features f1 . . . fn are relevant to legal category A.
Minor Premise:
Cited case and instant case are different in that
cited case has features f1 . . . fn, and instant case
does not have features f1 . . . fn.
Conclusion:
Cited case should not be used as a basis for
applying legal category A to instant case.
If we are considering the case State v. Biker (cited case) while
analyzing State v. Boostrider (instant case),203 we might construct this
simplified argument.
ARGUMENT BY LEGAL (DIS)ANALOGY: BIKER & BOOSTRIDER
Major Premise:
The extent to which the weight of a machine is
great enough to damage park grounds is relevant
to whether the machine is a vehicle.
Minor Premise:
Biker and Boostrider are dissimilar in that the
machine in Biker (motorcycle) was heavy enough
to damage park grounds but the machine in
Boostrider (Boosted Board) was not heavy
enough to damage park grounds.
Conclusion:
Biker should not be used in Boostrider as a basis
to conclude the Boosted Board is a vehicle.
We must consider again the critical questions. In effect, this
argumentation scheme is agnostic about the outcome of the cited case. If
the two cases are relevantly dissimilar with regard to category A, there is
no need to consider the outcome of the cited case. Instead, the major
premise here takes the form of an assertion of relevance of the features,
and the minor premise asserts that these features are present in one case
and not the other. Note that despite the framing of the scheme, either the
cited case or instant case may lack particular features; the cited case could
have NOT HEAVY, and the instant case’s failure to have that feature means
that it has HEAVY.

203. See supra text accompanying notes 38–41.
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CRITICAL QUESTIONS: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL (DIS)ANALOGY
CQ1 Acceptable Scheme Question: Do the circumstances of this
argument permit application of a cited case?
CQ2 Relevance Question: On what basis are features f1 . . . fn, relevant
to legal category A?
CQ3 Similarity Question: With regard to each feature f1 . . . fn, is the
feature present in the cited case and absent in the instant case?
CQ4 Inconsistent Precedent Question: Is there some other case that is
also dissimilar to instant case in that it has features f1 . . . fn, except
that legal category A was applied in that case?
CQ5 Binding Precedent Question: To what extent is the cited case
binding on the court in the instant case?
CQ6 Precedent Quality Question: Was the cited case wrongly decided?
Because the role of this argumentation scheme is to exclude
consideration of the cited case in assessing legal category A, the
information in the argumentation scheme and in the critical questions is
considerably reduced from the legal analogy argumentation scheme. Like
all schemes, CQ1 addresses the question of whether the scheme is
appropriate. Generally, the answer will be “yes” in any context where the
legal analogy argumentation scheme is appropriate. CQ2–CQ3 ask
whether the premises are true. CQ4–CQ6 ask the same questions that the
analogous questions in the legal analogy argumentation scheme do.
As we can see from both the legal (dis)analogy schemes, what counts
as a relevant (dis)similarity is perhaps the central question this article
places in issue, a question the next section takes up.
C. Relevant (Dis)Similarity in Depth
An important theoretical concern about the account of legal analogy
given in this article is the question of relevant similarity. As noted above,
some theorists have challenged legal analogy as lacking rational force
because it is impossible to say with certainty which (dis)similarities are
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relevant and which are not.204 Others have argued that by identifying
principles under which two cases are (dis)similar, an argument’s
proponent is simply identifying a legal rule, for example, “a machine with
a motor is a vehicle because a motor means the machine can move faster,
raising the risk of injury to pedestrians” or “a very light machine is not a
vehicle because it is not nearly as likely to injure pedestrians and damage
park property as a car or motorcycle.” The critics say that if there is no
legal rule, then the argument has no rational force, and if there is a legal
rule, it is merely deductively applied and there is no legal analogy.
But in applying Biker and Cyclist in the Boostrider case, the court may
see the cited cases as embodying competing principles that lie behind the
rule in section 15.15. “Every rule has a background justification—
sometimes called a rationale—which is the goal that the rule is designed
to serve.”205 In the case of section 15.15, the justification could plausibly
be stated as “avoiding injury to pedestrians and damage to park
property.”206 Another general principle might be “users of the park should
be able to get around by the means they choose unless some rule or
principle provides otherwise.” Neither of these is a rule in the sense used
by legal theorists because they are not sufficiently definite. They lack the
definiteness of rules because “people understand that the background
justifications themselves are often too vague to be helpful, too fuzzy to
give people the kind of guidance they expect from the law, and too subject
to manipulation and varying interpretation to constrain the actions of
those who exercise power.”207
So, for example, if the statute read “anyone who does anything in the
municipal park that risks injury to pedestrians or damage to park property
is guilty of a gross misdemeanor,” its application could scoop up a wide
204. See supra notes 104 and 148–149 and their accompanying text. See generally supra Part I. Not
just the relevance of similarities, but the quantity of them, factors into some conceptions of analogy. See
Lilian Bermejo-Luque, Deduction Without Dogmas: The Case of Moral Analogical Argumentation, 34
INFORMAL LOGIC 311, 313–15 (comparing characterizations of analogy based on quantitative assessment
of similarities–called there “a posteriori” analogies–with characterizations of analogy based on similarities
that consider “both analogs . . . members of a category that is settled, a ‘new’ category for which the very
analogy stands . . . [that] may be difficult or just impossible to specify in so many words without losing
part of the analogy’s insight.”).
205. Schauer, THINKING, supra note 7, at 15.
206. Note that the approach described here could certainly be subject to criticism from advocates
of the movement described as “new textualism.” See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism & Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013) (reviewing Antonin Scalia & Bryan
A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2013)). I hoped to curb that criticism
in part by making the hypothetical’s purpose part of its enactment. In any case, the new textualists may
be right; and then again, they may not. Id. at 533–34. The job of the middle-level theory in this article is
not, however, to choose winners in debates about high theory. Rather, it is to impose normative constraints
on practitioners, some of whom may have one high theory, others another, but many of whom have only
their argumentative folkways.
207. Schauer, THINKING, supra note 7, at 16.
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variety of activities. Practically, the risk of overreach and inconsistent
application by law enforcement would rise, and the courts would spend
much more time determining whether particular instances of behavior
were in or out of the rule. By enacting section 15.15 as they did, legislators
chose to govern only one potentially dangerous or damaging activity.
Thus, I contend that frequent need to balance justifications and the
practical utility of legal analogy dispose of this complaint; or should at
least cause us to take it with a grain of salt in practical contexts.
But at least two other complaints are very important. The first
complaint: why do proponents and opponents of legal analogies fail to
identify the bases upon which the (dis)similarities are relevant? Because
the relevance of the (dis)similarities in a legal analogy is critical to its
work, it seems essential to making the basic argument. Leaving it out is
tantamount to leaving out the minor premise (that the cited case was
decided in a certain way) or failing to mention what the (dis)similarities
are. Nevertheless, it seems lawyers and judges routinely do so.208 The
second complaint: when argument proponents do identify those bases,
what criteria should we use to evaluate them? Every conception of legal
analogy discussed above, and in particular the argumentation schemes for
it, make reference—either admiringly or grudgingly—to the relevance of
(dis)similarities. The argumentation schemes must account for it, and so,
presumably, must arguments by legal analogy. I can provide at most a
schematic answer here to develop both theoretically and empirically in
future.
As to the first complaint—the absence of an assertion of relevance of
(dis)similarities, at least two approaches present themselves: Note first
that we can interpret arguments by legal analogy that do not express the
relevance part of the major premise as enthymematic. Remember that we
use the concept of enthymeme to reconstruct omitted premises from
argument forms.209 Weinreb supports this view: the basis for relevance
“is obvious or taken for granted and need not be stated expressly; but
some such indication must be contained in or implied by a declaration that
two things are similar, to establish the relevance of the particular
similarities (and irrelevance of the dissimilarities) at stake.” 210 So on this
view, an argument that asserts the cited case and instant case share—or
diverge on—some characteristics is implying that those characteristics are
relevant to the legal category. Even if we accept that relevance is implied,
we are left with one of two responses.
On the one hand, we may take the normative stance that an argument
208. Consider the example in the next section, which is derived from the empirical study described
below. See infra text accompanying notes 256–257.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 126–128.
210. Weinreb, supra note 3, at 78.
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by analogy is defective in the absence of an explicit assertion of relevance.
We might view this as an instance of a conventional rule in the legal
community that a legal argument that does not fully state the premises and
conclusions of its argumentation scheme is defective. One reason for this
convention might be that a failure to state all the premises and conclusion
places a higher burden on the opponent of the argument. Rather than just
challenging an explicit principle that would make the (un)shared
characteristics relevant, she must imagine and reconstruct all the possible
principles the proponent of the argument could have adduced and respond
to them or find another authority that declares a given characteristic
irrelevant. If this is the norm, we should expect argument proponents to
typically expressly state their bases for the relevance claim and judges
and argument opponents to criticize them when they do not.
On the other hand, we could react to the absence problem by removing
the relevance element from the argumentation scheme. Argumentation
schemes represent the forms of arguments warranted by their contexts of
use, in this case, by the conventions of American courts and the
community of American judges and lawyers. If argument proponents
typically do not assert how the (dis)similarities in arguments are relevant
to the legal category in question, then perhaps our system has effectively
allocated the role of reconstructing that part of the major premise to the
argument’s opponent; the critical question regarding the relevance of the
(dis)similar features would remain, but instead of testing one of the
premises in the argumentation scheme, it would invite new information,
in the form of an argument for or against relevance. Whether this is the
correct course probably also depends on whether judges and argument
opponents criticize argument proponents for the omission—the same
empirical question mentioned in the previous paragraph.
What is conventional in American law, and therefore, which of these
approaches is appropriate, thus depends on what lawyers and judges do—
an empirical question. This article provides the basis and direction for the
research necessary to answer that question.211
The second complaint was a lack of evaluative criteria for claims about
the relevance of (dis)similarities between cases, whether those claims are
made as part of the argumentation scheme, the critical questions, or both.
This is in a sense to open a whole new avenue of inquiry. Because an
assertion that (dis)similarities are relevant can be justified only by another
argument, the acceptable form(s) of such arguments is an empirical and
normative question: empirical in that what is acceptable in the American
legal community requires study of what is accepted there, and normative
in that it affects how we judge (and teach) the work of legal analogy.

211. See infra note 256 (describing a current effort to study this empirical question).
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Given that we will have to postpone the empirical inquiry, at least for
now,212 the following paragraphs can provide the first important steps for
a normative framework for arguing about the relevance of
(dis)similarities.
First, an argument about relevance is simplified by “the extent to which
a previous case, especially a controlling one, has announced which
similarities are relevant and which are not.”213 Such an announcement can
be express or implied. For example, the court in Biker could expressly
have announced that “whether a machine has a motor is relevant to
determining whether it is a vehicle.” Instead, it strongly implied that when
it noted that the motorcycle had an engine and that the bicycle did not.
The wise proponent of an argument by legal analogy (whether she states
the basis for the relevance of (dis)similarities or not) will be prepared to
offer more in response to this question: why is it relevant whether the
machine has a motor? She will likely argue that it is relevant “on the basis
of policy, principle, or something else.”214 The argument might take this
form:
1. Motors tend to be heavy and make a vehicle capable of greater
speeds.
2. Greater weight and speed increases the probability of injury to
pedestrians and damage to the park.
3. Protecting pedestrians and park property is identified as a goal
of the statute in its preamble.
4. Consequently, whether a machine has a motor is relevant to the
determination whether it is a vehicle for purposes of the statute.
Of course, the court in Biker or Cyclist could have expressed this
argument. But in its absence, the legal analyst must still be prepared to
assess the relevance of motors.
The identification of rationales of this type requires invention or
discovery. Different lawyers may identify different bases for relevance of
(dis)similarities. This argument for relevance of motors is one that the
defense in Boostrider might identify; it permits Ms. Boostrider to argue
that despite the motor on her Boosted Board, it does not go as fast as
bicycles (not vehicles) and is not nearly so heavy as a motorcycle or car.
The prosecutor might offer a different justification for relevance, better
212. See infra note 256.
213. Schauer, THINKING, supra note 7, at 95.
214. Schauer, THINKING, supra note 7, at 98.
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suited to her case. Either lawyer would be unwise not to consider other
possible characterizations.
The mere mention of a fact by a court in its analysis may be a basis for
concluding that the fact is relevant to the legal category—so with the
motor issue discussed here. We might conclude that the opinion is
enthymematic in just the same way we suggested above. 215 But what if
the court mentions a fact in its description of the facts of the case but does
not mention it again during its analysis? Given that the judge in a case
might have great compendia of facts from which to characterize the case,
the mere mention of a fact anywhere in the opinion might be enough to
start an argument about its relevance.216 But then the argument about
relevance may have to appeal to other cases and extrinsic evidence about
what policies or principles apply.
“Relevance is . . . a function of . . . contextual constraints put on
language uses . . . made explicit by means of legal arguments: the
argument from intention . . . from purpose . . . from legal history, and the
various sorts of systemic argument used in legal practice.”217 Legal
expertise, then, arises as one develops a mature sense of what types of
arguments about relevance are acceptable in the community of lawyers.
For purposes of a theory of relevant (dis)similarity, the framework should
develop after an empirical assessment of what is acceptable.218
D. The Argumentation Schemes Applied to a Legal Argument
For the argumentation schemes to be useful, we must be able to apply
them to the argumentative practices of lawyers and judges, and that
application should provide insights for producing and evaluating
arguments of the kinds we analyze. This section provides an example

215. See supra text accompanying note 209.
216. As Weinreb notes:
Only a small number of the details of the situation out of which the controversy arises
will affect the outcome; but all the details are potentially available for consideration,
because it is that specific situation and no other that needs to be resolved. The lawyers’
arguments and the judge’s opinion recite only those facts that they respectively believe
are material to the outcome. Although there are likely to be facts the relevance of
which is disputed, there are a great many others the relevance or, more likely, the
irrelevance of which is not in doubt.
Weinreb, supra note 3, at 50 (emphasis added). Whether an arguer can distinguish the instant case from
the cited case by reference to lawyers’ briefs filed in the cited case, which are widely available online
now, is another matter, which will have to keep until another time.
217. Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet, Analogy and Interpretation in Legal Argumentation,
SYSTEMATIC APPROACHES TO ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY 227, 238 (H. J. Ribeiro ed., 2014).
218. See infra text accompanying notes 256–257.
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drawn from the United States District Court, Southern District of New
York, adjudicating the issue of fair use in a copyright infringement case.
The example worked here provides evidence of the argumentation
schemes and critical questions described above, suggesting that the
argumentation schemes are a useful tool to analyze and produce such
arguments. It also shows lawyers engaging in an argumentative
practice—the use of straw-man arguments—that judges and law teachers
may wish to discourage.
Federal law provides copyright owners the exclusive right to make
copies and derivative works of copyright-protected works.219 A rights
holder can be either a plaintiff or defendant in a copyright infringement
case, as a secondary user can bring an action for declaratory judgment on
infringement.220 A secondary user may assert the affirmative defense of
fair use, which is a bar to the rights holder’s recovery for infringement,
and courts assess the defense using a four-factor test.221 The first factor is
“the purpose and character of the [secondary] use.”222 One issue in
assessing this factor is whether the secondary use is transformative—that
is, “whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or
message.”223
The opinion of Judge Cote in Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S.
Holdings, Inc.,224 resulted from the parties’ cross motions for summary
judgment, which had in turn precipitated six briefs: defendant’s
memorandum in support of its motion (“defendant’s motion”), plaintiff’s
opposition to it, defendant’s reply to plaintiff’s opposition, plaintiff’s
motion (“plaintiff’s motion”), defendant’s opposition to it, and plaintiff’s
reply to defendant’s opposition.225 The Associated Press (AP)—a
cooperative enterprise owned by 1,400 U.S. newspapers that produced

219. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).
220. 22 U.S.C. § 2201(a). See, e.g., Adjmi v. DLT Ent. Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512, 515 (S.D.N.Y.
2015).
221. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). The statute requires that “the factors to be considered shall include”
the four named factors, but it does not preclude courts considering other factors. Id.
222. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
223. Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
224. 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
225. Mem. of Law of Pl. the Assoc. Press in Supp. of its Mot. for Sum. J. on its Copyright
Infringement Claim, ECF No. 54 (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.]; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’
Mot. for Sum. J., ECF No. 56 (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Defs.’ Mot.]; Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to
Defs.’ Mot. for Sum. J., ECF No. 57 (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n]; Defs.’ Mem. of Law in
Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Sum. J., ECF No. 58 (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Defs.’ Opp’n]; Pl.’s Reply Mem.
of Law in Further Supp. of its Mot. for Sum. J. on its Copyright Infringement Claims, ECF No. 118 (Jan.
23, 2013) [hereinafter Pl.’s Reply]; Reply Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Sum. J., ECF
No. 123 (Jan. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Defs.’ Reply].
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between 1,000 and 2,000 news stories every day—was the rights holder
and plaintiff in this case.226 AP typically constructed its stories so that the
first part, or “lede,” contained the most critical information in the article,
with the balance of the article elaborating on it.227 AP licensed its stories,
each subject to copyright, to print newspapers but also for display on news
websites that paid it a fee; AP licensed at least some of them to display
the entire story on the internet to consumers who paid no fees to access
them.228 AP had also licensed to “news clipping services” that permitted
“the distribution of excerpts from or snippets of its articles” to businesses
that wished to monitor mentions of them in the news.229
Meltwater used “automated computer programs or algorithms to copy
or ‘scrape’ an [AP] article from an online news source, index the article,
and deliver verbatim excerpts of the article to its [paying] customers in
response to search queries.”230 Meltwater’s customers could search for
content, including AP stories, both by setting up a software “agent” to
find and store excerpts of all applicable stories,231 and by performing “ad
hoc” searches, the results of which Meltwater’s service did not save.232
The record showed that Meltwater competed for—and sometimes won—
customers from AP and its news-clipping licensees.233
Important in this context was the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp.234 The Kelly court found that a free publicly available
search engine’s use of “thumbnail” versions of photographs displayed
elsewhere on the web was transformative and a fair use; the thumbnails
were lower-resolution versions of the entire photos displayed
elsewhere.235 Each party in its briefs, and the court in its opinion, cited
Kelly in support of its argument about whether Meltwater’s secondary use
of the works here was transformative.
In its motion memo’s discussion of transformativeness, AP did not
immediately raise Kelly, instead discussing other cases that it concluded
were similar to Meltwater’s secondary use and that found those secondary
uses not to be transformative.236 Anticipating Meltwater’s reliance on
Kelly, however, AP devoted the next subsection of its argument to Kelly

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

931 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 542.
Id.
Id. at 543.
931 F. Supp. 2d at 544.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 543.
336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 815.
Pl.’s Mot., supra note 225, at 10–15.
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and related cases.237 Rather than merely distinguish those cases, AP
constructed the argument it claimed Meltwater would make and then
dissected it by application of the critical questions. AP asserted that
Meltwater would argue its service:
constitutes a transformative use because it offers access to a search
engine that allows its customers to discover information in the news
media relevant to their business and because many of its customers
only look for mentions of their company or its press releases rather
than the content of the news articles, an allegedly different purpose.
Meltwater [will base] this argument on two Ninth Circuit cases,
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) and Perfect
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d t 146 (9th Cir. 2007), which held
the search engines at issue in those cases to be transformative uses
as electronic reference tools whose use of thumbnail images of
photographs in search results served a different purpose than the
original.238
We can easily recast this in the legal analogy argumentation scheme.239
ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY: KELLY & ASSOCIATED PRESS
Major Premise:
Kelly and the instant case are relevantly similar in
that both interpreted fair use, and in both, the
secondary use could function as a search engine.
Minor Premise:
The secondary use in Kelly was transformative.
Conclusion:
The secondary use in the instant case is
transformative.
The relevance of the similarity is implied enthymematically.
AP’s critique of this argument focused on the last critical questions
first, beginning with CQ 7 Binding Precedent Question. AP asserted that
the “Second Circuit has never found a transformative use when the
original work was not incorporated as raw material into a new work with
a further expressive purpose or new expressive meaning. Nor has it found
that merely making a work more accessible constitutes a transformative
use sufficient to justify extensive verbatim use of it.” 240 By reference to
the Second Circuit, AP drew attention to the fact that Kelly—a Ninth
237. Id. at 15–20.
238. Id. at 15–16 (internal quotations and some internal citations omitted). Plaintiff’s motion
actually asserted that Meltwater already had made this argument in a declaration. Id. at 15.
239. See generally supra Part III(A), for the argumentation scheme and critical questions.
240. Pl.’s Mot., supra note 225, at 16.
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Circuit case—was not binding on the New York district court, and that no
Second Circuit case had adopted Kelly’s holding. It answered CQ 7 in the
negative.
AP then answered both CQ 8 Precedent Quality Question and CQ 6
Inconsistent Precedent Question by offering another argument by legal
analogy to the Second Circuit case Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v.
Kirkwood.241 We can reconstruct this argument using the argumentation
scheme as well:
ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY: INFINITY & ASSOCIATED PRESS
Major Premise:
Infinity and the instant case are relevantly similar
in that both interpreted fair use, and in both, the
secondary user provided “snippets” of the rights
holder’s works, took rights holder’s unaltered
works and marketed them to its customers, and
claimed its use was of benefit to society.
Minor Premise:
The secondary use in Infinity was not
transformative.
Conclusion:
The secondary use in the instant case is not
transformative.
Without explicitly saying Kelly was wrongly decided, AP presented an
analogy that strongly suggested it was, answering CQ 8 in the affirmative.
It also answered CQ 6 in the affirmative by locating a presumptively valid
legal analogy for the instant case that came out against a finding of
transformativeness.
Finally, AP embarked on a lengthy attack based on CQ 2 Similarity
Question, arguing that Meltwater’s service is not a search engine in the
sense that the service in Kelly was.242 At the same time, it offered an
affirmative response to CQ 5 Relevant Dissimilarity Question, arguing
that Meltwater’s service replaced AP’s products, unlike the search engine
in Kelly, and that Meltwater’s service was more commercial in that it
charged for the search-engine function, while the defendant in Kelly did
not.243
So far, of course, we have considered only AP’s arguments, and its
effort to anticipate Meltwater’s Kelly argument was a straw man if in fact
Meltwater did not make that argument.
In fact, Meltwater did use Kelly, but only as one among a larger number
241. 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998). See Pl.’s Mot., supra note 225, at 16–17.
242. Pl.’s Mot., supra note 225, at 18–19.
243. Id. at 18–20.
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of cases, including cases from the Second and other circuits. One sentence
and the string cite that follows it together make an interesting example:
While some transformative uses may change the original work, that
is not necessary, as a “transformative use can also be one that serves
an entirely different purpose.” The Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust,
No. 11-cv-6351(HB), 2012 WL 4808939, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10,
2012) (full copies of books made by digital archive were
transformative “because the copies serve an entirely different
purpose than the original works”); accord Bill Graham, 448 F.3d at
609 [(2d Cir. 2006)] (use is transformative where the defendant’s
purpose in using images “is plainly different from the original
purpose for which they were created”); Lennon v. Premise Media
Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (defendants’ use
“transformative because they put the song to a different purpose”);
A. V. ex rel Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th
Cir. 2009) (a use “can be transformative in function or purpose
without altering or actually adding to the original work”).244
Note that the string cite, taken together with facts about the present case
provided in nearby paragraphs, provided at least two fully formed, though
enthymematic, legal analogies. For both Author’s Guild and Lennon,
Meltwater’s description of the cited cases’ facts and outcomes in the
explanatory parentheticals implied that the instant case should come out
the same way because of these similarities. We cannot quite be certain
about Bill Graham, though, because of the use of the present tense in the
parenthetical—“use is transformative.” We can read this in at least two
ways: on the one hand, the Bill Graham court may have found the
defendant’s use there was “plainly different” and therefore
transformative. On the other hand, perhaps the court there adopted a rule
to the effect that if a defendant’s purpose is plainly different, it is
transformative; but in that case, we do not know whether the court found
the defendant’s use was plainly different.245 A similar question arises with
regard to Vanderhye’s “a use can be transformative”—was it in that case?
Meltwater did not tell us.246
Meltwater did not mention the Infinity case in its motion memo, a fact

244. Defs.’ Mot., supra note 225, at 9.
245. Of course, the reader can probably look up the cited case, but the argument’s author should
not foist the work onto the reader.
246. Meltwater would have done better to follow the advice of the Bluebook and begun its
parenthetical with a gerund, e.g., “finding a use transformative because the defendant’s purpose in using
images was ‘plainly different from the original purpose for which they were created.’” See THE
BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, rule 1.5 (20th ed. 2015).
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that AP addresses in it its opposition to Meltwater’s motion: “Meltwater’s
failure to grapple with—or even acknowledge—the Second Circuit’s
decision in Infinity is particularly egregious.”247 In the text that follows,
we can perhaps read AP as claiming an argumentative victory in its
application of the Infinity case as precedent, because Meltwater’s failure
to challenge AP’s presumptively acceptable application of the
argumentation scheme to Infinity means that the court should accept that
argument. Of course, Meltwater would have been disinclined to mention
a case that goes against it its own motion memo.
AP’s opposition also went on to critique Meltwater’s use of Kelly,
offering yet another answer to CQ 5 Relevant Dissimilarity Question, this
time a more detailed statement of the difference between Meltwater’s use
of AP’s stories and ArribaSoft’s use of Kelly’s photos: “use of thumbnail
images of Kelly’s photographs was transformative only because the
thumbnails were of such low resolution that they could not be used to
fulfill an aesthetic purpose.”248 It contrasts the instant case, where it
claimed Meltwater’s products superseded AP’s own.
Meltwater propped up its use of Kelly and attacked AP’s use of Infinity
in its opposition to AP’s motion. With regard to Kelly, Meltwater took the
tack of reframing AP’s argument as a deductive one. Meltwater wrote:
AP claims . . . only a use that adds new expression to the original
work can be transformative . . . . To the contrary, the case law
consistently recognizes that “making an exact copy of a work may
be transformative so long as the copy serves a different function than
the original work.” Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165. This understanding
repeatedly has been applied in cases involving search engines. The
Ninth Circuit in Kelly thus rejected the argument that “because
Arriba reproduced [plaintiff’s] exact images and added nothing to
them, Arriba’s use cannot be transformative” and found that
Arriba’s thumbnails, although “exact replica[s],” were
transformative because they “served an entirely different function
than Kelly’s original images.” Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818-19.249
Meltwater recast AP’s argument as a deductive argument in what I shall
call “modus tollens” form, which it then refuted by use of a critical
question.250 The deductive argument takes this form:
247. Pl.’s Opp’n, supra note 225, at 9.
248. Id. at 9.
249. Defs.’ Opp’n, supra note 225, at 3–4 (some citations omitted; emendations in original).
250. Modus tollens is a variant of the deductive syllogism under which the consequent of the major
premise is false, compelling the conclusion that the antecedent must also be. Contrast this with the faulty
deductive form in the example of denying the antecedent above. See supra text accompanying notes 69–
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ARGUMENT BY LEGAL DEDUCTION (“MODUS TOLLENS”): KELLY &
ASSOCIATED PRESS
Major Premise:
According to copyright case law (Kelly), if a
secondary use is transformative, it must add new
expression to the original work.
Minor Premise:
Meltwater did not add new expression to AP’s
stories.
Conclusion:
Meltwater’s use of AP’s stories are not
transformative.
As we saw above, the modus ponens deductive argumentation scheme
includes CQ 4 Rule Question, which asks whether the cited case actually
states the rule that the argument proponent has offered as its major
premise.251 Meltwater shows that the answer must be negative, as the
Kelley court continued to conclude the secondary use there was
transformative despite the fact that it included “exact replicas” of the
rights holder’s works. It remains unclear, however, whether AP made its
argument in such a categorical form; in other words, it appears likely that
Meltwater constructed and tore down its own straw man here.
Meltwater also used a critical question from the legal analogy
argumentation scheme (about relevant differences) to distinguish Infinity,
asserting simply that the earlier case “did not involve an Internet search
engine, or a service analogous to one.”252
Both parties continued their efforts in their reply briefs, 253 but perhaps
this is sufficient analysis to offer two observations. First, the arguments
of these two parties show the structures of the legal analogy
(dis)argumentation schemes and their critical questions. The parties are
generally explicit in asserting the premises necessary to fill the
argumentation scheme, with the exception that the relevance of the
(dis)similarities must be inferred, and at least one conclusion is omitted
enthymematically but clearly implied. The argumentation schemes (or
something like them) would have been a useful way to come up with the
arguments that the attorneys actually used.
The second observation here is of a bit more concern. Each party
constructed in its own brief at least one straw-man argument, where it
used an argumentation scheme to impute an argument to the other side—
72. As with my use of “modus ponens” there, I take some technical liberty by applying “modus tollens”
as the name of a sentential logical form.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 190–192.
252. Defs.’ Opp’n, supra note 225, at 7.
253. See generally Pl.’s Reply, supra note 225; Defs.’ Reply, supra note 225.
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an argument the author of the brief knew to be unacceptable—in order to
demolish it using critical questions. In each case, the argument the brief’s
author imputed to its opponent was a highly reduced form of the argument
the opponent made or was likely to make. This kind of argumentative
practice forces the other side to reframe or rebut arguments that it has not
actually made; and it forces the reader—the judge and her clerks—to
engage in comparative reading of the briefs to test whether the authors of
briefs say what their opponents say they said. This raises questions of
fairness and efficiency in legal arguments.
If empirical study shows these straw-man practices are commonplace,
they may be acceptable, at least on some level, to legal practitioners.
Given the inefficiencies they engender, however, judges and law teachers
may seek to reframe conventional attitudes by pointing out these practices
and criticizing them.
CONCLUSION
This article argues that current theories of legal analogy are too deeply
grounded in deduction as the sine qua non of all types of good legal
arguments. As a result, they leave too much reasonable and rational legal
argumentation unexplained and undisciplined. Informal logic and
argumentation schemes offer a means of providing and assessing the
rational discipline that legal analogy should exhibit.
This article provides a solid foundation for future research into
argumentation schemes generally and the legal (dis)analogy
argumentation schemes specifically by demonstrating the reasonableness
of arguing by legal analogy. Broader study is required to develop
argumentation schemes for other types of informal legal argument. This
article has provided two—for legal analogy and legal (dis)analogy—and
has tentatively offered one for legal deduction. Professor Walton and his
colleagues have described a great many more argumentation schemes,254
and many of them may be adapted to legal argumentation. Others do not
exist in the argumentation-scheme literature but may nonetheless be
useful for legal practice. For example, some lawyers do make use of
covering rules when arguing with legal analogies.255 An argumentation
scheme that warrants the adoption of such a rule as part of a legal
deduction would prove valuable.
But before work to broaden use of argumentation schemes and
informal logic in the law is undertaken, deeper theoretical study is
required to ground the argumentation schemes given in this article and

254. See generally Walton et al., supra note 11.
255. See supra note 83.
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argumentation schemes generally in theories of legal argumentation and
reasoning broadly accepted in the courtroom and legal academy.
Deeper study in another direction is required to ascertain what the
conventions of the legal community actually are relating to the
argumentation schemes presented in this article.256 As Schauer and
Spellman note: “it remains to be seen just how often genuinely analogical
reasoning takes place in legal argument and judicial decisions. That
inquiry is of necessity empirical.”257 Such studies should provide
evidence about whether the argumentation schemes are valid and provide
reliable descriptions of legal professionals’ argumentation. They will
serve a quasi-normative function, because an empirical description of
what practitioners find acceptable functions as description of their norms.
This does not mean, however, that judges, scholars, and teachers of law
cannot advocate for norms that do a better job living up to standards of
ethics and efficiency. For example, if straw-man arguments of the kind
discussed in Part III(D) are typical, judges and scholars may call out
practitioners who engage in them to curb the practice.
One important question is whether judges and lawyers tend, as Weinreb
claims, not to use covering rules when arguing with the use of cases.258
Central to his claims and those of this article is the assertion that logical
deduction is not necessary to draw a legal analogy from a cited case to an
instant case. The skeptics discussed above assert that legal analogy, to
have rational force, must include a deductively applied rule that brings
the cited case and instant case under a single “covering rule.”259 So far,
no empirical study has confirmed Weinreb’s assertion and this article’s
intuition that judges and lawyers frequently use legal analogy without
covering rules.260
This study of the argumentation schemes in law should be dialogical:
empirical work will support inductive generalizations about what lawyers
and judges do, and those generalizations may warrant changes to the
argumentation schemes presented here. At the same time, principles of
reasonableness and rationality—which lie at the heart of argumentationschematic thinking—are inconsistent with practices such as straw-man
arguments, for which there may be widespread empirical evidence. That
256. See supra Part III(C) for a discussion of empirical questions related to the argumentation
schemes and particularly in the context of relevant (dis)similarities. I am currently performing an
empirical study that examines some 200 lawyers’ briefs and court opinions in a random selection of federal
copyright cases from the last several years. My team is coding and analyzing the argumentative uses of
cited cases in those artifacts in an effort to characterize the relative frequency and characteristics of
arguments by legal analogy.
257. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 3, at 268.
258. See supra note 82.
259. See supra Part I(C)(1).
260. See supra note 82.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss3/2

58

Larson: Law’s Enterprise

2019]

LAW’S ENTERPRISE

721

may be grounds for arguing for changes in how lawyers argue.
I acknowledge that nothing said in this article, and nothing that comes
from the proposed empirical work, will be demonstrated deductively. But
I hope I have persuaded the reader that nothing interesting about the law
ever is.
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